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According to conventional wisdom, tort law allows physicians to set their
own standard of care. While defendants in ordinary tort actions are expected
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, physicians traditionally
have needed only to conform to the customs of their peers.
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However, judicial deference to physician customs is eroding. Gradually,
quietly and relentlessly, state courts are withdrawing this legal privilege.
Already, a dozen states have expressly rejected deference to medical customs
and another nine, although not directly addressing the role of custom, have
rephrased their standard of care in terms of the reasonable physician, rather
than compliance with medical custom.
Even more important than the raw numbers is the trend revealed by the
decisions. The slow but steady judicial abandonment of deference to medical
custom began in earnest in the 1970s, continued in the 1980s, and retained its
vitality through the 1990s. Showing no signs of exhaustion, this movement
could eventually become the majority position.
Furthermore, many of the states that theoretically continue to defer to
custom actually apply the custom-based standard of care in a way that oper-
ates very much like a reasonable physician standard. As a consequence, the
malpractice law described in the hornbooks and taught in many Torts and
Health Care Law classes only vaguely resembles malpractice law as it oper-
ates in many courts.
This disassociation between the law in books and the law in action
has gone, thus far, undetected. Yet, it gradually is reshaping the founda-
tions of malpractice law. This Article documents this ongoing transformation
ofthe malpractice standard of care and explores its likely origins and implica-
tions.
Part I of this Article outlines the conventional understanding of medical
malpractice law. Part II then describes the quiet movement away from custom
that has occurred in the past few decades. Part III explores the possible
reasons for this dramatic and fundamental revision of basic malpractice law,
and Part IV outlines some of its implications.
I The Conventional Understanding
In ordinary tort cases, the defendant's compliance with custom is admis-
sible, but not binding on the jury.' In defense of this rule, Justice Holmes
explained that "[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be
done, but what ought to be done is set by the standard of reasonable prudence,
whether it usually is complied with or not."2 In the famous case of The TJ
Hooper,3 Judge Learned Hand noted that "a whole calling may have unduly
1. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 295A (1975) (stating custom is factor but
not controlling in determination of whether actor is negligent); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSERAND KEETON ON TORTS § 33, at 193-96 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining bearing of custom
upon standard of reasonable care).
2. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468,470 (1903).
3. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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lagged in the adoption of new and available devices."4 These sentiments are
so widely shared that there is no minority rule.'
Physicians, and sometimes other professionals,' have been treated much
more favorably. As the Prosser and Keeton hombook explains, traditional tort
law "gives the medical profession.., the privilege, which is usually emphati-
cally denied to other groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct,
merely by adopting their own practices."7 Although physicians are expected
to behave reasonably, the reasonableness of their conduct is determined by
ascertaining their compliance with customary practices!
Judicial deference to customary clinical practices concretely alters the
task of the jury in a medical malpractice case. Under a custom-based standard
of care, the relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant behaved like a
reasonable person or even whether she behaved as a reasonable physician, but
instead whether the defendant conformed with customary practices. Conse-
quently, the jury's inquiry is positive, rather than normative. In theory at
least, the jury determines what the customary practice is. It does not decide
what the custom ought to be. The law assigns this latter normative judgment
4. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir. 1932).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCI.ES, COUNCIL DRAFT No. 1,
Reporter's Notes to § 11, cmt b (1998).
6. Some courts have extended the custom-based standard of care to other professions.
See, e.g., Osbom v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 121 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting
application of rule to physicians, nurses, and lawyers); McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377,
381 (Miss. 1994) (noting that rule applies to physicians, lawyers, and accountants); Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (holding that rule applies
to all professions furnishing skilled services for compensation); Matter of Yemmanur, 447
N.W.2d 525, 528 n.3 (S.D. 1989) (stating standard applies to all professions).
7. KEETONET AL, supra note 1, § 32, at 189.
8. See, e.g., Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (describing custom as majority rule); PATRICIA
DANZON,MEDICALMAIPRACICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBUCPOLICY 16,139-40 (1985)
(stating deviation from reliance on custom standard is "rare"); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 361 (1995) (same); DAVID M. HARNEY, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 89
(1973) (stating custom defines standard of care); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at 189
(same); SYLVIA LAW& STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROIT: THE POLITIcs OF MALPRACnE 7,
101 (1978) (same); CLARENCEMORPIS & C. ROBERTMORRIS,JR,MORRIS ON TORTS 55 (2d ed.
1980) (stating custom is rule in medical malpractice); James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A.
Siiciano, Universal Health Care and the ContinuedReliance on Custom in DeterminingMedi-
calMalpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384 (1994) (same); Alan H. McCoid, The Care
Required ofMedicalPractioners, 12 VAN]D. L. REV. 549,560,605-06 (1959) (same); Clarence
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147,1147,1158 (1942) (stating custom
normally should define standard of care); Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful
Error: The Historical Jurisprudence ofMedicalMalpractice, 1992 Wis, L. REV. 1193, 1212
(stating custom determines standard of care). Similarly, the Second Restatement of Torts states
that the physician must "exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed" by other
physicians. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) (emphasis added).
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to the medical profession collectively. Because the issue to be decided is what
physicians do, not why they do it, evidence ofthe ineffectiveness of customary
practices sometimes is excluded from evidence.9 As a California court ex-
plained in Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, ° "professional prudence is
defined by actual or accepted practice within a profession, rather than theories
about what 'should' have been done.""
The Osborn case illustrates the hurdle that this custom-based standard of
care imposes upon the malpractice plaintiff. In Osborn, the plaintiff offered
proof that the defendant had failed to follow recommendations and admoni-
tions contained in the professional, literature. Yet, the court would not permit
the case to reach the jury without proof that these recommendations "had
actually become the norm within the profession."'" Absent proof of departure
from custom, the plaintiff could not prevail.
Not surprisingly, this remarkable rule has spawned a number of sub-
sidiary doctrines that limit or explain its operation. They include the follow-
ing:
1. The requirement of expert testimony to educate the jury about cus-
tomary clinical practices.' 3
2. The "two schools of thought" or "respectable minority" rule which
precludes liability when physicians are divided among two or more
respectable schools of thought, and the defendant satisfies the tenets
of one.'
4
3. The locality rules, now loosened substantially, which determine the
source of the binding customary norms. 5
9. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987,990-91 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating evidence
of effectiveness of treatment is irrelevant); cf. FURRoWET A-., supra note 8, at 361 (noting that
defendants normally do not offer evidence of effectiveness).
10. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App. 1992).
11. Osbom v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 128 (Ct App. 1992).
12. Id. at 127.
13. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 365-67 (stating expert testimony is required to
establish customary practice); KEETONET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at 189 (same).
14. See, e.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974) ("[A] physician does not
incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of several recognized courses of trealment");
Haase v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d. 108,114 (Mo. 1967) (stating there can be difference of opinion
among competent physicians); FUERROW ET AL.,supra note 8, at 382-84 (describing "respectable
minority" defense).
15. At one time, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant had deviated from local
custom. Most courts no longer make local custom the benchmark, opting instead to measure
the defendant against the standards in similar localities or nationwide. See, e.g., WLLIAM J.
CVRRANETAL.,HALTaCARELAW AND ETHICS 343-44 (1998) (discussing loosening of locality
rule); FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 360 (stating national standard is majority rule).
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4. The "error in judgment" rule insulating reasonable treatment deci-
sions that have had bad outcomes. 6
5. The "best judgment" cases requiring physicians with unique informa-
tion to use it regardless of customary norms."
6. The experimental protocol cases permitting patients to consent to non-
customary experimental treatments, at least when conventional care
is ineffective. s
7. The consent to unorthodox medicine cases allowing the patient to opt
out of conventional treatment.19
8. The "common knowledge" cases permitting plaintiffs' verdicts despite
the absence of expert testimony and despite evidence that the physi-
cian complied with customary standards.
20
9. Endless refinements of the phrasing of the standard of care (e.g., does
it require "average" skill, 21 the skill ofa physician in "good standing,"22
etc.). 23
16. E.g., Capolino v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 605 N.Y.S2d 87,88 (App.
Div. 1993) (ordering new trial because "error in judgment" jury instructions were not given);
Silver, supra note 8, at 1193 (noting existence of "best judgment" principle). The modern trend
may be to abandon this doctrine because it merely restates the need to prove negligence in
addition to a bad outcome and it may confuse the jury by suggesting that any good faith
judgment is immune. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 813-16 (Mnn. 1986)
(concluding "honest error in judgment" instruction is inappropriate); McCourt v. Abernathy,
457 S.E,2d 603,606 (S.C. 1995) (noting "error in judgment" instruction may confuse jury).
17. E.g., Toth v. Community Hosp. 239 N.E.2d 368,373 (N.Y. 1968) (stating physician
may be negligent if he fails to employ expertise); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452
N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (App. Div. 1982) (same).
18. E.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408,423-24 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating patient's informed
consent precludes finding of negligence for experimental procedure); BARRYR. FMROWET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 206 (3d ed. 1997) (same).
19. See Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing assumption of
risk defense in action against provider for unconventional cancer treatments).
20. See, e.g., Leonard v. Watsonville CommunityHosp., 305 P.2d36,42 (Cal. 1956) (per-
mitting case to reach jury because counting instruments is matter of common knowledge); Ault
v. Hall, 164 NE. 518, 522-23 (Ohio 1928) (permitting sponge count issue to go to jury despite
evidence that physician complied with custom); FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, at § 6-2, at 368
(describing common knowledge exception); KEETONET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at 189 (same).
21. E.g., KEETON ET AL, supra note 1, § 32, at 187 (stating "average" is not preferred
phrasing of standard of care).
22. E.g., Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475,481 (Mo. 1972) (stating "good standing"
is misleading); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A(1965) (phrasing standard of care in
terms of "good standing").
23. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 6-2, at 362 (describing various ways of stating
standard of care); KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at 187 (describing preferred phrasing of
standard of care).
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For purposes of understanding the customary standard of care, the most
important of these subsidiary malpractice rules is the respectable minority
doctrine. Typically called either the "respectable minority rule" or the "two
schools of thought" rule,24 this doctrine ostensibly permits physicians to
choose among respectable schools of medical thought without fear of liability.
In Pennsylvania, for example, "where competent medical authority is divided,
a physician will not be liable if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a
course of treatment supported by reputable, respectable, and reasonable
medical experts."'  The respectable minority rule arises out of judicial
unwillingness to choose among conflicting schools of thought when physi-
cians themselves cannot reach a consensus. 6
To summarize, physicians theoretically are insulated from liability both
when they comply with an established custom and when respectable medical
opinion is divided. In principle, plaintiffs are not free to litigate what the
custom ought to be or which school of thought is superior. In the words of
one often-quoted opinion, "[P]hysicians and surgeons must be allowed a wide
range in the exercise of their judgment and discretion. The law will not hold
a physician guilty ofnegligence... unless it be shown that the course pursued
was clearly against the course recognized as correct by the profession gener-
ally."'27 Intheory, therefore, the plaintiff who hopes to prevail must prove that
the defendant's conduct on the day in question fell entirely outside of all
common practices.
Although tort law's traditional deference to customary medical practices
has generated both heated criticisms' and pointed defenses," courts and
24. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 337 (Del. 1961) (stating defendant's
choice of one of two acceptable techniques was not negligence); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d
160, 164 (Tex. 1977) (describing "respectable minority" rule); FURRoW ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 6-5, at 250.
25. Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 472 A2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
Haavi Morreim offers the example of a physician choosing among several acceptable treatments
for breast cancer, including radical or modified radical mastectomy, or lumpectomy, with
accompanying variations of radiation or chemotherapy. E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment
and the Standard ofMedical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719,1735 (1987).
26. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §299A, cmt. f(1 965) ("The law cannotunder-
take to decide technical questions of proper practice over which experts reasonably disagree.").
27. McPeak v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., 229 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950)
(quoting Bailey v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 296 S.W. 477,479 (Mo. CL App. 1927)).
28. See, e.g,, HARNEY, supra note 8, at 90 (stating customary practice should be only one
factor in determining standard of care); Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard
of Care: IMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE. L. J. 1375,1377-78,1394-95 (criticizing
law's deference to customary medical practice); Patricia M. Danzon, TortLiability: A Minefield
forManaged Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491,493, 508 (1997) (same); Herman C. Fala, TheLaw
ofMedicalMalpractice in Pennsylvania, 36 U. PrT. L. REV. 203,213-14 (1974) (stating that
HeinOnline  -- 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 168 2000
MALPRACTICE LA WAT THEMILLENIUM
commentators alike have assumed that the custom-based standard of care
is nearly universal. While commentators faithflly acknowledge the infamous
Washington case of Helling v. Carey,"0 which rejected reliance on custom
in favor of a reasonability test, they typically characterize it as an aberrant
deviation from the norm." Thus, one prominent authority concludes that
only on "rare occasions" can the plaintiff proceed without proof that the
defendant deviated from customary norms. 2 Aother scholar concluded that
custom-based standards were "well-nigh universal."" In fact, Richard Epstein
concluded that the consensus in favor of custom became stronger after
customs should not be conclusive); Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 8, at 1382-89 (criticizing
continued reliance on custom); John Kimbrough Johnson, Jr.,An Evaluation of Changes in the
MedicalStandard of Care, 23 VAND. L. REv. 729,745,747 (1970) (same); Joseph H. King, Jr.,
In Search of a Standard of Carefor the Medical Profession: The "A ccepted Practice"Formula,
28 VAND. L. REV. 1214, 1236-41 (1975) (same); Silver, supra note 8, at 1193 (criticizing
continued reliance on custom). See generally Morreim, supra note 23 (explaining that custom
does not account for scarcity of resources and cost containment); E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified
Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 356 (1989) (same);
E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity and Unfair Liability, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1033
(1986) (same); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equiy, and the Unitary Medical Malpracice Stand-
ard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439 (1991) (same).
29. See, e.g., RICHARDA. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 6.2, at 140-41 (1999) [hereinafter EPSTEIN,
TORTS] (supporting law's deference to custom in medical malpractice); James Henderson, Jr.,
Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467,492-95
(1976) (describing dangers of straying from custom standard in medical malpractice cases);
McCoid, supra note 8 (defending custom standard); Morris, supra note 8, at 1164-65 (same);
Richard N. Pearson, TheRole of Custom in MedicalMalpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528 (1976)
(same); Jeffrey J. Rachlinsk, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U.
C. L. REV. 571,574,608-13 (1998) (concluding custom avoids hindsight bias). See generally
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper
(describing history of custom in tort law).
30. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). For the facts of Heiling, see infra notes 3642 and
accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., FURROWET AL.,supra note 8, at 361 n.16 (stating other states have rejected
Helling); FURROW ET AL., supra note 18, at 178 (same); KEETONET AL., supra note 1, § 32, at
219 n.21 (stating Helling's reasonability test goes against general trend); Rachlinski, supra note
27 at 611 n.166 (stating custom standard is majority rule).
32. FuRROwETAL.,supra note 8, at 361. This treatise correctly suggests that many ofthe
early cases rejecting deference to custom were "common knowledge" cases. Id. at 368. How-
ever, it oversimplifies the early cases in two respects. First, those opinions did not expressly
limit their holdings to common knowledge cases. Second, many of the early cases involved
complex activity. See, e.g., Lundahl v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 235 N.E.2d 671,673 (11.
App. Ct. 1968) (describing defendant's failure to diagnose plaintiff's hemorrhoids); Favalova
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544, 546-47 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (describing injuries
plaintiff received during x-ray process).
33. Pearson, supra note 29, at 528.
HeinOnline  -- 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 169 2000
57 WASH. &L E L. REV 163 (2000)
Helling."4 Although a couple of authors have hinted that support for custom-
ary standards may be weakening, they cite only one or two states as having
joined Washington35 The reality is quite different.
ff. The Quiet Trend away from Custom
Judicial deference to physicians' customs is quietly eroding. By the
beginning of 1999, a dozen states had expressly refused to be bound by
medical customs. Nine additional states, while not explicitly rejecting defer-
ence to custom, had chosen to phrase the duty owed by physicians in terms of
reasonability, rather than compliance with medical customs. In addition, the
steady pattern of defections from the custom-based standard of care over the
past several decades suggests that more states will follow.
Furthermore, many of the states that continue to endorse a customary
standard of care in principle do not appear to police adherence very closely.
It is fairly common for plaintiffi in these states to reach a jury even when their
experts have stated only that the defendant's conduct is not "acceptable" or
"appropriate" or fails to meet the "standard of care." The experts in these
cases have not been required to demonstrate that the defendant deviated from
an established custom. As a result, it is misleading to suggest that a successful
malpractice plaintiff must prove that the defendant physician has deviated
from all common practices or even to make the more narrow claim that
compliance with customary norms provides a complete defense. The truth is
more complex.
A. Helling in Perspective
Every student of health law reads the 1974 Washington case Helling v.
Carey.36 In that case, Barbara Helling contended that her ophthalmologist had
failed to give her a simple test that would have detected her glaucoma.' Her
experts conceded that doctors did not routinely administer this test to patients
her age. 8 The jury then returned a verdict for the defendant, which the
Washington Supreme Court reversed. Not satisfied to rule that compliance
34. EPsTEIN, TORTS, supra note 29, at 141.
35. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 18, at 153-54 (citing Wisconsin case); KEETONET
AL., supra note 1, Supp. 1988 at 30 n.53 (citing Minnesota and Virginia cases).
36. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
37. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981,981-82 (Wash. 1974).
38. Id. at 982. This concession may not have been accurate. See Jerry Wley, The Impact
of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345,
361 (1982) (suggesting that testimony given about absence of routine testing of younger patients
was wrong).
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with customary practices was not an absolute defense, the court also held that
failure to administer routine glaucoma tests to all patients was negligent as a
matter of law.
The Helling decision generated volumes of commentary. It came in the
midst of the 1970s malpractice insurance crisis, and most of the reaction was
critical and even alarmist. In fact, the decision reportedly caused some
insurers to withdraw from the medical malpractice market.39 The scholarly
literature has generally assumed that Helling is a rogue case,40 rejected even
in Washington by a subsequent enactment of the state legislature.41 One
scholar concluded that, despite Helling, the consensus in favor of customary
standards "has, if anything, grown stronger in recent years.t
42
These interpretations of Helling are only half correct. In one respect, the
Helling decision was and remains genuinely aberrant. No other court has
endorsed the Washington Supreme Court's decision to take the issue of medi-
cal negligence away from the jury and to rule, without the benefit of expert
testimony, that a customary practice is negligent as a matter of law.43 This
aspect of Helling was deeply flawed and has justly contributed to its reputa-
tion as a rogue case.
However, Helling's rejection of customary norms was not aberrant. Not
only has Helling's rejection of customary standards survived in Washington
with the eventual blessing of the legislature,' but many other courts have
39. See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 15, at383.
40. See, e.g., FURROWET AL., supra note 18, at 178 (suggesting that only "small number
of cases" have rejected customary standards and that they all involved common knowledge cases
in which expert testimony was not necessary); LAW & POLAN, supra note 8, at 118 (concluding
that Heiing's uniqueness is attested to by volume of commentary that it generated); Eric E.
Fortess & Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Uncertainty, Diagnostic Testing and Legal Liability, 13
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 213, 215 (1985) (describing case as "anomaly"). Most of the
commentary was unfavorable. See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 383 (stating Helling
created storm of legal criticism); KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW AND AmCAN HEALTH
CARE 684 (1998) ("The response to Helling was largely unfriendly.").
41. The state legislature's attempt to reverse Helling was sidestepped in a subsequent
case. See Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919, 921, 924 (Wash. 1979) (concluding Helling's rule
applies after legislative enactment). However, later legislation appears to have adopted the
court's reasonable care test. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.040 (1998). See Harris v. (roth, 663
P.2d 113,116-18 (Wash. 1983) (stating that later legislation has adopted Helling standard).
42. EPSTEN, TORTS, supra note 29, at 141.
43. This part of the holding was limited to its facts even in Washington. See Meeks v.
Marx, 550 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (stating negligence normally is jury ques-
tion). In addition, Washington now requires expert testimony on reasonable care "[a]bsent
exceptional circumstances such as were present inHelling." Harris v. Groth, 663 P.2d 113,120
(Wash. 1983).
44. See supra note 41 (describing legislature's eventual endorsement of Helling standard).
HeinOnline  -- 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 171 2000
57 WASH. &L E L. REV 163 (2000)
reached the same conclusion. Although few of these courts have expressly
relied on Helling, perhaps because of its notoriety, many have agreed with its
rejection of customary standards.
This distinction between Helling's rejection of the customary standard
of care and its ruling on the facts as a matter of law has eluded some observ-
ers. Multiple authors, for example, cite the California case of Barton v.
Owen4" as having rejectedHelling.46 Yet, Barton actually endorsed Helling's
refusal to defer to customary norms. It only rejected the notion that courts
should rule on reasonability as a matter of law." Said the court:
We fully agree with the plaintiff's contentions on the connectionbetween
custom and due care. However, we fail to see how this leads to the conclu-
sion that, because a custom may be negligent, such negligence can be
found as a matter of law.'
Washington was neither the first state to reject custom-based standards nor the
last.
B. States Expressly Rejecting a Custom-Based Standard of Care
Seventeen states have appellate cases that explicitly reject deference to
custom in medical malpractice cases. In at least twelve of those states, the
cases rejecting custom-based standards appear to be authoritative today.49
The Illinois Supreme Court first rejected custom in a famous 1965
hospital negligence case, Darling v. Charleston CommunityMemorial Hospi-
tal."0 Custom, it concluded, never should be conclusive because a profession
could adopt unreasonable habits."' Since 1968, the Illinois intermediate
appellate courts have extended this reasoning to cases against physicians. 2
45. 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1977).
46. See Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper, supra note 29, at 37 n.84 (stating that
Barton rejects Helling); FUYRROW ET AL., supra note 8, at 361 n.16 (same); WING ET AL., supra
note 40, at 684 (same).
47. See Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501-02 (Ct. App. 1977) (stating expert
testimony is required to constitute basis for due care).
48. Id. at 498-99.
49. In two states (Florida and Minnesota) the leading cases are from intermediate appel-
late courts. In three others (Louisiana, Ohio and Texas) the clearest rejection of custom has
come from intermediate appellate courts.
50. 211 N.E. 2d 253 (111. 1965).
51. Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E. 2d 253,257 (Ill. 1965).
52. E.g., Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hosp., 392 N.E.2d 203, 209 (11. App. Ct. 1979)
("[G]eneral custom is not conclusive."); Lundahl v. Rockford Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 235 N.E2d
671, 674 (111. App. Ct. 1968) ("It is entirely possible, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in
the case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital. .. that what is the usual or
customary procedure might itself be negligence.").
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In Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, for example, the court explained
the subsidiary role of custom:
In a professional malpractice case, such as here, where expert testimony is
required to establish the requisite standard of care, evidence that a defen-
dant's conduct conformed with local usage or general custom is indicative
of due care; it is not, however, conclusive. It may be overcome by contrary
expert testimony (or its equivalent) that the prevailing custom or usage
itself constitutes negligence.'
In 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed that compliance with custom-
ary standards is not conclusive in actions against medical professionals.s4
In Louisiana, a 1962 intermediate appellate court decision concluded that
"conformity with the standard of care observed by other medical authori-
ties ...cannot be availed as a defense in a malpractice action when the
criterion relied upon is shown to constitute negligence."55
53. Chiero, 392 N.E.2d at 209.
54. Advincula v. United Blood Seres., 678 NXE.2d 1009, 1027-28 (M11. 996) (stating, in
action against blood bank, that custom was not conclusive even for medical professionals and
favorably citing Chiero and Lundahl on this point).
55. Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544, 550 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
Louisiana uses a two-tiered standard of care. See Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 73
So. 2d 781,786 (La. 1954) (announcing two-tiered standard). Physicians must possess the skill
usually possessed by other physicians and also use reasonable care in the application of their
skill. Id. Before Favalora, Louisiana case law interpreted this test to protect physicians who
complied with customary norms. See id. at 787-88 (applying test favorably to defendant
physicians). Thereafter, however, intermediate courts in Louisiana have concluded that this
two-tier test permits a plaintiff to challenge a proven custom if the custom is proven to be
negligent This interpretation first was enunciated inFavalora v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
144 So. 2d 544, 550 (La. Ct App. 1962) ("[C]onformity with the standard of care observed by
other medical authorities in good standing in the same community cannot be availed of as a
defense in a malpractice action when the criterion relied upon is shown to constitute negli-
gence."). It subsequently has been treated as authoritative. See, e.g., Davis v. Duplantis, 448
F.2d 918, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1971) (refusing to apply Favalora without expert testimony about
negligence); George v. Travelers Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 340,344 (E.D. La. 1963) (citing Fava-
lora favorably); Barbella v. Touro Infirmary, 596 So. 2d 845, 848 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
Favalora to be inapplicable when plaintiff fails to meet burden of proving standard of care);
Slack v. Fleet, 242 So. 2d 650, 656 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (refusing to apply Favalora in absence
of adequate proof of failure to use reasonable care). But see Ware v. Medical Protective Ins.
Co., 621 So.2d 54, 57-58 (La. 1993) (holding that standard is what is "ordinarily" done). The
legislature adopted the judicial two-tiered standard in 1975, in LA. REv. STAT. § 9:2794 (West
1997), as follows:
In a malpractice action based on the negligence of a physician.. . the plaintiff shall
have the burden of proving: (1) The degree of knowledge or skill possessed or the
degree of care ordinarily exercised by physicians... licensed to practice in the
state of Louisiana and actively practicing in a similar community or locale and
under similar circumstances; and where the defendant practices in a particular
HeinOnline  -- 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 173 2000
57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 163 (2000)
In addition, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Oklahoma all had decisions
rejecting deference to custom prior to the Helling decision in 1974. In each
of these jurisdictions, however, the current authority of those decisions is
unclear.56
Then came Helling. Three years later, the Texas Supreme Court explic-
itly rejected customary standards in Hood v. Phillips.7 In Hood, the court
defined Texas's new malpractice standard of care as what a "reasonable and
prudent" physician would do, rather than what customarily was done.58 A
subsequent case afflrmed that "custom or practice... is not conclusive on the
issue of the standard of care .... We see no reason for a different rule in
medical malpractice cases ....
In the 1980s, courts in Florida,' Mississippi,61 Minnesota,62 and Wyo-
ming63 rejected deference to medical customs. Courts in Colorado, the Dis-
specialty and where the alleged acts of medical negligence raise issues peculiar to
the particular medical specialty involved, then the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing the degree of care ordinarily practiced by physicians . . . within the involved
medical specialty. (2) That the defendant either lacked this degree of knowledge
or skill orfailed to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best judgment
in the application of the skill.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794 (West 1997) (emphasis added). The statute has been construed as
codifying prior case law. See Leyva v. Iberia Gen. Hosp., 643 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (La. 1994)
(stating that statute codified Meyer).
56. The law in those states is discussed in detail later in this subsection. See infra text at
notes 69-98.
57. 554 S.W.2d 160,165 (Tex 1977).
58. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977). In addition, the court rejected
the respectable minority rule because it "could convey to a jury the incorrect notion that the
standard for malpractice is to be determined by a poll of the medical profession." Id.
59. Kissinger v. Turner, 727 S.W.2d 750,755 (Tex. App. 1987).
60. See Doctors Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Evans, 543 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (citing Nesbitt v. Community Health, 467 So. 2d 711,714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985))
(disregarding customary methods test and emphasizing prudent person standard).
61. See McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377, 381 (Mtss. 1994) (stating physician must
be minimally competent and act reasonably prudent); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 873
(Miss. 1985) (same).
62. See Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, PA., 375 N.W.2d 861,868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(upholding reasonable care standard). But see Ogle v. Bassett Creek Dental, PA., No. C6-96-
2060 1997 WL 292163, at *2 (Mn. June 3, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (assuming that
medical standard of care is customary).
63. See Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981) (articulating standard as
"that which is required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances").
64. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. MeCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1194 (Colo. 1994) (citing
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509,512 (Colo. 1992)) (finding rebuttable presump-
tion that adherence to customary practices provides reasonable standard of care).
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trict of Columbia,6 Nevada66and Wisconsin!' did so in the 1990s. Although
customary standards continue to benefit from a rebuttable presumption of
reasonability in Colorado and Nevada, the plaintiff can rebut this presumption
simply by offering expert testimony establishing that the prevailing custom is
deficient.' The jury then decides whether the customary practice constitutes
due care.69
In addition to these twelve states, four additional states have appellate
decisions expressly rejecting customary standards: Pennsylvania, Ohio, Cali-
fornia, and Oklahoma. 0 However, the current law in these states in unclear.
As a result, these states cannot be classified as "reasonable physician" states
at this time. Nevertheless, the presence of appellate decisions in these states
rejecting customary standards further illustrates the breadth ofjudicial disen-
chantment with the traditional, customary standard of care.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected custom-based standards in
Incollingo v. Ewing.1 Responding to a defendant's argument for a customary
65. See Ray v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 404 (D.C. 1996) (upholding
reasonably prudent professional standard); see also Cleary v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 691
A.2d 148, 156 (D.C. 1997) (stating that duty owed is that of "reasonably prudent physician").
66. See Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391,396 n.5 (Nev. 1993) (agreeing with
Colorado Supreme Court that customary practices may be deficient).
67. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996) (stating that standard
of care applicable to physicians is what is reasonable given state of medical knowledge at time
of treatment).
68. Brown, 858 P.2d at 396 n.5. In that case, the plaintiff did not attempt to prove that
the prevailing standard in the blood banking community was deficient As a result, the court's
statement on this issue is dictum. Id. at 396 nn.4-5. The court did not mention the Nevada
statute, which uses language from both tests, but appears to call for customary standards. NEV.
Ray. STAT. § 41A.009 (1997) (defining medical malpractice as failure to "use the reasonable
care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances").
69. See Quintana, 827 P.2d at 521 (emphasizing jury's role in determining whether
customary standard constitutes due care).
70. A fourth state, New York, has a case rejecting custom in very narrow circumstances.
In the well-known case ofToth v. Community Hospital at Glen Cove, New York's highest court
stated that the usual deference to customary standard must yield when "a physician fails to
employ his expertise or bestjudgment...." Toth v. Community Hosp., 239 NE.2d 368,372-73
(N.Y. 1968). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently supervised the
hospital nursing staff during the administration of oxygen to a premature baby. Id. at 370. The
nurses administered the oxygen at the customary rate, rather than at the safer, lower rate the
defendant had ordered, resulting in blindness to the child. Id. Said the court, "There is no policy
reason why a physician, who knows or believes there are unnecessary dangers in the community
practice, should not be required to take whatever precautionary measures he deems appropriate."
Id. at 373. Since this decision, however, the Nw York Court of Appeals has made no further
inroads in developing the customary standard of care. Given the narrow context in which the
court rejected customary norms, New York cannot yet be treated as a reasonable care state.
71. 282A.2d 206,217 (Pa. 1971).
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standard, the court said "[t]his would be to say that as long as a course of
conduct, however unreasonable by ordinary standards, is the norm for the
group, all members of the group are thereby insulated from liability so long
as they do not deviate therefrom."7 2 That standard, it continued, "is not the
law. 73 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently clouded the issue by
endorsing a version of the respectable minority rule. 4 However, as long as
the jury ultimately determines whether the defendant's school of thought was
respectable, Pennsylvania's law remains compatible with a reasonable physi-
cian standard.
In the 1928 case of Ault v. Hall, 5 the Ohio Supreme Court expressly
rejected reliance on custom in a foreign object case.76 In that case, the defen-
dant physician relied on the customary practice of delegating the counting of
sponges to the sponge nurse.77 Said the court: "[C]ustom will not justify a
negligent act or exonerate from a charge of negligence. '  Because Ault was
a "common knowledge" case in which the court permitted the jury to reach a
decision without expert testimony, some commentators have concluded that
the court's rejection of a custom-based standard of care is limited to common-
knowledge cases. 9 Yet, nothing in the court's pointed rejection of a custom-
ary standard of care suggests that its holding on the standard of care is limited
to common knowledge cases.8" Furthermore, a 1963 Ohio intermediate court
of appeals decision declined to limit Ault to common knowledge cases.
Morgan v. Sheppard8' applied the holding in Ault to a more complex malprac-
tice case in which the plaintiff had presented expert testimony. Customary
standards, said the court, "do not furnish a test which is controlling on the
72. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A-2d 206, 217 (Pa. 1971); see Donaldson v. Mafucci, 156
A,2d 835, 838 (Pa. 1959) (requiring both skills usually possessed by physicians and also care
and judgment of reasonable man); Fala, supra note 28, at 213-14.
73. Incolingo, 282 .2d at 217.
74. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964,965 (Pa. 1992) (recognizing "respectable minority"
defense if employed by "considerable number of recognized and respected" physicians). Other
authors believe that the law of Pennsylvania remains unclear. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 17.3 n.6 (2d ed. 1986); Pearson, supra note 29, at 532-33. But see Fala, supra
note 28, at 213-14 (concluding that Pennsylvania law does not make customs conclusive).
75. 164 N.E. 518 (Ohio 1928).
76. Ault v. Hall, 164 N.E. 518,523 (Ohio 1928).
77. Id. at519.
78. Id. at 523 ("Long-continued careless performance of a duty by any trade, business or
profession will not transform negligence into due care.").
79. See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 6-2, at 368; Pearson, supra note 29, at 550-
52.
80. Ault, 164 N.E. at 522-23.
81. 188 N.E.2d 808 (Ohio Ct App. 1963).
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question of negligence." 2 Instead, physicians must "exercise that degree of
care which a reasonable and prudent person in the same profession or calling
would have exercised." 3 By 1963 (a decade before Helling), Ohio seemed to
have rejected a custom-based standard.
Since then, however, the standard of care in Ohio has been clouded by
inconsistent language in subsequent decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court.
The confusion began in Bruni v. Tatsumi.84 Parts of the court's decision re-
affirm the reasonable physician standard. The court, for example, held that the
standard of care for medical specialists is "that of a reasonable specialist...
in the light of present day scientific knowledge in that specialty field""5 and
that general practitioners must provide the care that "a physician of ordinary
skill, care and diligence" would have provided.86 These tests appear to permit
a plaintiff to reach the jury with testimony that the defendant's care did not
meet the standards of a "reasonable" physician. Proof of breach of custom
does not appear to be essential. This reading is also consistent with the
court's favorable citation ofAult. However, the court also said that physicians
must exercise "the average degree of skill, care and diligence exercised" by
other physicians, and the court made reference to "recognized" and "prevail-
ing" standards.' These later statements cast doubt on the court's commitment
to a reasonability standard of care.
The court's language inBerdyckv. Shinde88 is similarly confusing. First,
the court described the physician's obligation as one of "good practice" con-
sistent with a reasonable physician test and "the care and skill reasonable in
light of their superior learning and experience." '89 Yet, the court arguably was
sympathetic to a customary standard of care when it said that physicians must
"employ that degree of skill, care and diligence that a physician or surgeon of
the same medical specialty would employ in like circumstances. "90 The same
confusing language appears in Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hospital &Health
Center,91 in which the court both said that the standard of care is "dictated by
82. Morgan v. Sheppard, 188 N.E.2d 808,816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
83. Id.
84. 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976).
85. Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Ohio 1976) (rejecting strict locality rule for
specialists), aff'd, Berdyckv. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1020-21 (Ohio 1993) (quoting at length
from syllabus in Bruni).
86. Bruni, 346 N.E2d at 677.
87. Id. at 676.
88. 613 N.E2d 1014 (Ohio 1993).
89. Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014,1020-21 (Ohio 1993).
90. Id. at 1021 (citing Bruni, 346 N.E.2d at 676).
91. 529 N.E2d 449 (Ohio 1988).
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custom," and atthe same time quoted Bruni forthepropositionthat physicians
must behave like a "reasonable specialist" and "a physician of ordinary skill,
care and diligence."'  Obviously, Ohio is a difficult state to classify.
Apparently, the jury instructions in Ohio use the reasonability language
from Bruni.3 In trial courts that use these instructions, experts for plaintiffs
will not have to prove that the defendant deviated from customary practices.
As a result, it is tempting to classify Ohio as a reasonable care state, but this
Article has not done so because of the ambiguity in the cases.
In California, two lines of intermediate appellate court decisions directly
considered the issue and reached contrary conclusions.94 A 1994 decision by
the California Supreme Court failed to eliminate the confusion.' On the one
hand, the court explained that the "professional" nature of the action merely
identified the special knowledge and skill that might be a "circumstance"
affecting the "ordinary prudence" expected of the professional. This part of
the court's opinion is consistent with a reasonable physician standard of care.
On the other hand, the court's introductory discussion ofthe standard of care
favorably cited both ordinary care language and customary care language from
its earlier opinions without acknowledging the inconsistency.' As a result,
92. Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. and Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449, 455-56 (Ohio
1988).
93. See Tirpak v. Weinberg, 499 N.E.2d 397,400 (Ohio Ct App. 1986) (articulating jury
instructions).
94. Compare Dincau v. Tamayose, 182 Cal. Rptr. 855, 867 (Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting
reliance on custom), and Barton v. Owen, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494,498 (Ct. App. 1977) (same), with
Wilson v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 517, 524 (Ct. App. 1993) (deferring to
custom), and Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App. 1992) (same).
The approved jury instructions for the Superior Court of Los Angeles County use a custom-
based standard. COMIE O NSTANDARDJURYINSTRUCIONS,CIVIL,OFTHSUPERIORCOURT
oF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAUiFORNiA, CALiFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIviL, BOOK OF
APPROVED JRYINSTRUCTIONS § 6.00.1 (BAA 8th ed. Pocket Part 1999) ("use the care and skill
ordinarily exercised").
95. See generally Flowers v. Torrance Mem'l Hosp. Med'I Ctr., 884 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1994)
(failing to eliminate confusion regarding standard of care).
96. Id. at 145.
97. Because of the procedural posture of the case, the court did not rule directly on the
relevance of customary norms. Id. at 147. After declaring that the testimony of the plaintiff's
expert witness was "defective," the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant Id.
at 144. The court of appeals reversed because the defendants had failed to dispute a theory of
"ordinary" negligence. Id. The California Supreme Court concluded the defendants' conduct
should be measured by only one standard of care commensurate with the risk posed by the
circumstances. It said that "[W]hether the cause of action is denominated 'ordinary' or
'professional' negligences or both, ultimately only a single standard [of care] can obtain under
any given set of facts and any distinction is immaterial to resolving a motion for summary
judgment" Id. at 146. Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court
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California's standard of care will remain unclear until this ambiguity is
resolved?
Finally, Oklahoma has a 1936 case expressly rejecting reliance on
custom.' That case, however, never has been cited regarding the standard of
care and a more recent case may silently overrule it."° Currently, Oklahoma
should be treated as a customary care state.
To recap, twelve states have expressly refused to defer to custom in
medical malpractice cases."' Pennsylvania probably rejects custom as well,
although a recent case clouds the issue. In three additional states, the case law
is conflicting or ambiguous. Overall, a quarter of the states currently decline
to defer to medical customs and several others have at least one appellate
opinion advocating such a shift.
and remanded the case for application of a single standard of care. The court did not specifi-
cally state whether this single standard of ordinary care would, for physicians, be defined by
compliance with customary practices. Id. at 147.
98. The California Civil Code does not contain a definition of malpractice, but it does
define a malpractice immunity in terms of reasonable care.
No health care provider shall be liable for professional negligence or malpractice
for any occurrence or result solely on the basis that the occurrence or result was
caused by the natural course of a disease or condition, or was the natural or ex-
pected result of a reasonable treatment rendered for the disease or condition.
CAL. Cmv. CODE § 1714.8 (West 1998) (emphasis added).
99. See McBride v. Roy, 58 P.2d 886, 888 (Okla. 1936) ("[C]ustom and usage are not
necessarily determinative of whether proper care was used, but they help considerably on the
question.").
100. See Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic, 516 P.2d 534, 538 (Okla. 1973) (finding that
physicians must have "learning, skill, and experience ordinarily possessed by others of the
profession").
101. In two states (Florida and Minnesota) the only authoritative cases are from intermediate
appellate courts. Supra notes 60 and 62. In two others (Louisiana and Texas) the clearest
rejection of custom has come from intermediate appellate courts. See supra notes 55 and 59. In
all ofthese twelve states except Nevada, courts have refused to defer to the customs of physicians,
not merely hospitals (whose duties might more readily be defined in terms of reasonable care).
In Nevada, the rejection of a custom-based standard occurred in a blood bank case, and the
Nevada appellate courts have not yet been asked to apply it in a case involving physicians. See
Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391,396 n.5 (Nev. 1993). In Colorado and the District
of Columbia, the first cases rejecting conclusive reliance on custom involved blood banks, but
the holdings have since been applied to physicians. See State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v.
McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1194 (Colo. 1994) (holding that physician customs are not conclu-
sive); United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 518 (Colo. 1992) (rejecting custom in
blood bank case); Cleary v. Group Health Assn., Inc., 691 A,2d 148,156 (D.C. 1997) (applying
reasonable physician standard); Ray v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 404 (D.C.
1996) (rejecting custom in blood bank case). However, the Nevada court stated expressly that
it was applying and defining the "professional" standard of care-the same standard of care that
applies to physicians. See Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391,395-96 (Nev. 1993).
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C. States Phrasing the Standard of Care in Terms ofReasonability
Nine additional states have cases or statutes phrasing the malpractice
standard of care in terms ofwhat a reasonable physician would do, rather than
what customarily is done. Unlike the jurisdictions described in the previous
section, however, these states do not have judicial opinions explicitly rejecting
deference to medical customs.
In Indiana, for example, physicians must use the care "exercised by
reasonably careful, skillful, and prudent practitioners."'1 2 In Maryland, the
duty owed is that of a "reasonably competent practitioner."1 3 Similar lan-
guage is used in Kentucky,"M Oregon, 10 5 Virginia,10 West Virginia,' 7 and,
102. Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.Ed 185, 187 (Ind. 1992); see Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d
189, 191 (Ind. 1992) (holding that plaintiff's expert must establish -what reasonable doctors
similarly situated would have done).
103. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245,253 (Md. 1975).
104. See Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. 1991) (requiring "degree of care and
skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner"); accord Reams v. Stutler, 642
S.W.2d 586, 588 (Ky. 1982) (same); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970) (same).
Some ambiguity arguably remains because Blair in 1970 said that "we will leave determination
of the standard to the medical profession and not the lay courts." Blair, 461 S.W.2d at 373.
The more recent eases, however, use a reasonability test When I practiced in Kentucky, it was
common-place to ask experts whether the defendants had violated "the standard of care" without
further defining the standard.
105. See OR. REv. STAT. § 677.095 (1997) (defining degree of care as "that degree of care,
skill and diligence that is used by ordinarily careful physicians . . . in the same or similar
circumstances in the community... or a similar community"); Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp.,
772 P.2d 929,933 (Or. 1989) ("[A] physician must always exercise reasonable care.").
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (1992) ("Mhe standard of care by which the acts or
omissions are to be judged shall be that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably
prudent practitioner in the field of practice or speciality in this Commonwealth."); Raines v.
Lutz, 341 S.E.2d 194, 196 (Va. 1986) ("Health care providers are required by law to possess
and exercise only that degree of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitio-
ner in the same field of practice or specialty in Virginia."); accord Bryan v. Burt, 486 S.E.2d
536 (Va. 1997) (stating physician must demonstrate degree of skill and diligence employed by
reasonably prudent practitioner).
107. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-3 (1994. The West Virginia Code states:
The following are necessary elements of proof that an injury or death resulted from
the failure of a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care: (a) The
health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning
required or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider.., in the same
or similar circumstances.
Id. But see Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 393 (W. Va. 1995)
(finding that erroneous instruction was not prejudicial); Howe v. Thompson, 412 S.E.2d 212,
215-17 (W. Va. 1991) (allowing instruction that contained elements of both reasonability and
custom). In 1994, a federal court concluded that West Virginia would reject a custom-based
standard of care. Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1233-34 (S.D.W. Va.
1994).
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more ambiguously, in New Hampshire.' Montana uses reasonability lan-
guageto describe the duty owed by general practitioners,1°9 although its test for
specialists uses language ordinarily associated with a custom-based standard
of care."' Interestingly, legislation codifies this reasonability standard of care
in four of the states: New Hampshire, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia.
In Vermont a statute contains text consistent with both tests, but ulti-
mately it seems to require the care of a reasonably prudent physician. The
statute defines the duty of care as "[t]he degree of knowledge or skill pos-
sessed or the degree of care ordinarily exercised by a reasonably skillful,
careful, and prudent health care professional.""' In Rooney v. Medical
Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc.," 2 the state's highest court held that the
statute "measures the defendant doctor's conduct against what a reasonable
doctor would have done.""'
The law in Michigan and Arizona is less clear. The Michigan Supreme
Court has repeatedly used reasonability language. In Locke v. Pachtman,"4
for example, the court stated that the duty was "what a reasonably prudent
surgeon would do.""' 5 Yet, the commitment of the lower appellate courts to
that standard is still uncertain. In Beadle v. Allis,"6 the court stated that a
reasonability instruction requested by the plaintiff "was an accurate statement
of the law," but nonetheless permitted the trial court to rely exclusively on the
108. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:13 (1997) (considering -whether practitioner has
"acted with due care having in mind the standards and recommended practices and procedures
of his profession, and the training, experience and professed degree of skill of the average
practitioner of such profession, and all other relevant circumstances"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507-C:2 (explaining plaintiff has burden of proving "standard of acceptable professional in
the medical care provider's profession or specialty"); Morrill v. Tilney, 519 A.2d 293, 296-97
(N.H. 1986) (citingN.H. RLrv. STAT.ANN. § 508:13, establishing medical malpractice standard).
109. See Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204, 210 (Mont 1990) (requiring "the standard of
care of a 'reasonably competent general practitioner acting in the same or similar community...
in the same or similar circumstances'" (quoting Shikret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n,
349 A.2d 245 (Md. 1975))).
110. See Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 826 (Mont. 1985) (approving of jury
instructions requiring "skill and learning possessed by other doctors in good standing, practicing
in the same speciality and who hold the same national board certification").
111. 12 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1908(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
112. 649A.2d 756, 760 (Vt. 1994).
113. Rooney v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 649 A.2d 756,760 (Vt 1994); accord Short v. United
States, 908 F. Supp. 227,236 (D. Vt 1995) (quoting Rooney).
114. 521 N.W. 2d 786 (Mich.1994).
115. Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W2d 786,791 (Mich. 1994); see also Naccarato v. Grob,
180 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Mich. 1970) (requiring care of "reasonable specialist practicing in the
light of present day scientific knowledge").
116. 418N.W.2d906(Mich.Ct.App. 1987).
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"standard" custom-based jury instruction.' And in Cleveland v. Rizzo," s the
court's dictum described the standard as the skill "ordinarily possessed."119
As a result, Michigan cannot yet be classified as a reasonability state.
Finally, an Arizona statute requires physicians to exercise the "care...
expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider."'20 This language
certainly suggests a reasonability test. Yet, the state courts appear to assume
(without addressing the issue) that the standard of care remains customary.'
They certainly could reverse that position if a plaintiff directly raised the
issue."z In the meantime, the customary standard of care has not been en-
forced vigilantly. In one reported case, for example, the plaintiff was able to
reach the jury with expert testimony that the defendant's conduct was not
"reasonable."'" Despite these mixed signals, this Article classifies Arizona
as a custom state because that appears to be the current judicial understanding.
In total, nine states have phrased their standard of care for physicians in
terms of reasonability, rather than custom. The shift to a "reasonable physi-
117. Beadle v. Allis, 418 N.W.2d 906,911 (Mich. Ct.App. 1987).
118. 298 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct App. 1980).
119. Cleveland v. Rizzo, 298 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). Michigan's
standard of care is especially difficult to pin down because the standard is stated slightly differ-
ently in a state statute, standard jury instructions and state court rulings. The statute, passed in
1978, requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant failed to meet "the recognized standard
of acceptable professional practice" or, if a specialist, "the recognized standard of care within
that speciality." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a (West 1986). A 1993 amendment adds the
words "or care" aftertheword "practice." MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2912a (West Supp. 1999).
The form jury instructions calls for liability when the physician fails "to do something which
[physician] of ordinary learning, judgment, or skill ... would do." SJI2d 30.01, cited in Swanek
v. Huizel Hosp., 320 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). However, the state supreme
court has, since 1970, repeatedly characterized the standard of care as what a "reasonably
prudent" physician would do, as indicated in the text.
120. AIZ. Rzv. STAT. § 12-563 (1989) (emphasis added).
121. See Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 709 P.2d 517, 522-23 (Ariz. 1985) (finding
that manufacturers are not governed by customary standard of care, although physicians are);
Bellv. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180,1182 (Ariz. Ct App. 1988) ("[T]he reasonable man
standard is therefore replaced by a standard based upon the usual conduct of other members of
the defendant's profession .... [T]he plaintiff must present evidence of this accepted profes-
sional conduct to enable the jury to determine the applicable standard.").
122. The outcome will turn on the court's interpretation of the word "expected." The
Arizona courts will have to decide whether the standard of care is determined by what is
expected by society of a reasonably prudent doctor or, instead, whether it is governed by what is
expected by other physicians of a reasonably prudent physician. The former interpretation
intuitively makes more sense in the absence of specific evidence that the legislature meant to
delegate rule-making authority to physicians. See Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., P.S.,
663 P.2d 113, 117 (Wash. 1983) (concluding that "'expected by society' is the proper reading").
123. See McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338,341 (Ariz. Ct App. 1986) (noting that directed
verdict on whether physician acted reasonably was inappropriate).
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cian" standard of care is potentially very significant. The "reasonable physi-
cian" standard of care is the same test employed in the states that have ex-
pressly rejected a custom-based standard. Although it continues to be
physician-based, the reasonable physician standard potentially differs from a
custom-based standard of care in one crucial respect. It asks what a reasonable
physician would have done, not what is usually done. Juries still will stand in
the shoes of the physician but only to hold the defendant to the standard of care
expected of a person with special skills, 24 not to immunize physicians who
follow the pack. As a consequence of this change, juries may hear jury instruc-
tions describing the standard of care in terms of reasonability, rather than
compliance with custom, and judges may permit plaintiffs to reach a jury
without proving that the defendant failed to do what most physicians do.
Will the phrasing of the standard of care in reasonable-physician terms
actually have this effect? It already has. In Indiana, for example, the courts
have approved jury instructions using a reasonable physician standard." In
Vermont, too, the state supreme court has endorsed the use of the reasonable
physician standard in jury instructions. 26 Oregon's supreme court has not
directly faced the issue, but its discussion of improper jury instructions in a
1989 case strongly suggests that the jury is to be given the issue of reasonable
care.
127
The reasonable-physician test also has shaped the testimony required of
the plaintiff's experts. In Indiana, for example, the plaintiffs expert must
state "what other reasonable doctors similarly situated would have done.
'12
Michigan law appears to operate in a similar fashion.' Furthermore, in West
Virginia, a federal district court, applying the professional standard of care,
refused to grant a summary judgment against a plaintiff whose experts chal-
124. E.g., Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1020 (Ill. 1996) (dis-
cussing how professional's skill, care, and expertise are incorporated into reasonable person
standard).
125. See Miller v. Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 248 n.4 (Ind. Ct App. 1999) (approving trial
court instruction using reasonable physician test).
126. See Rooney v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 649 A.2d 756, 760 (Vt. 1994) (disapproving of
"error in judgment" language, but approving reasonable care language in challenged jury
instruction).
127. See Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp., 722 P.2d 929, 933 (Or. 1989) (overturning
verdict for defendant anesthesiologist because jury instruction wrongly suggested that physi-
cian's duty to "exercise reasonable judgment" depended on existence of "reasonable differences
of opinion").
128. Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189,191 (Ind. 1992).
129. See Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786,791 (Mich. 1994) (stating than expert must
explain "what a reasonably prudent surgeon would do, in keeping with the standards of profes-
sional practice").
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lenged the customary practices of the blood-banking industry as dilatory.130
In addition, anecdotal evidence from Kentucky and New Hampshire suggests
that they, too, refuse to defer to medical customs.
13
'
Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that some of the reasonable-physi-
cian states ultimately will conclude that reasonable physician behavior is
defined by customary practices. 132 The possibility that some of these states
will eventually return to a customary standard of care is heightened by the fact
that a few of these states shifted to reasonability language by virtue of tort
reform statutes that presumably were not intended to make litigation easier for
plaintiffs. Other states judicially rephrased their standard of care when they
abandoned the locality rule. 3 3 Neither context suggests a conscious intent to
modify the basic, underlying standard of care. When Indiana abandoned the
locality rule, for example, the court described its redrafting of the standard of
care as "a relatively modest alteration of existing law."'
1 34
Thus far, however, the evidence from states like Indiana indicates that the
change in terminology has been accompanied by a genuine change in the
standard of care.135 When the nine reasonable-physician states are combined
with the dozen states expressly rejecting custom-based standards, over forty
percent of the states now have moved to a reasonable-physician standard of
care. In addition, several others states, like Pennsylvania, Ohio, Arizona,
Michigan, and California, have some authority favoring a reasonable-physi-
cian standard and could easily join the others.
130. Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (S.D.W. Va. 1994). The
West Virginia law on jury instructions is less clear. See Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found.,
Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 393 (W.Va. 1995) (finding that jury instruction with erroneous language
on standard of care was not prejudicial).
131. In Kentucky, where I practiced for several years, plaintiff's experts commonly
testified only that the defendant's conduct had not met the "standard of care." Lawyers in New
Hampshire report a similar experience.
132. Courts using a custom-based standard of care typically characterize the custom-based
standard of care as an interpretation of the reasonable care standard, not a deviation from it See
supra note 8.
133. E.g., Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Ind. 1992) (noting that locality is one
of several factors); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A-2d 245, 253-54 (Md.
1975) (same); Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204,210 (Mont. 1990) (same).
134. Vergara, 593 N.E.2d at 188.
135. Whether the state retains some deference to medical customs will not be certain until
plaintiffs in these states challenge conduct that complies with an undisputed custom. When
plaintiffs challenge conduct that conforms to one of several common approaches, trial courts
appear to let the jury decide if the defendant's approach was reasonable. See infra text at notes
136.46. Thus, a lawsuit is not likely to test whether the state continues to give some deference
to medical customs unless the plaintiff has challenged an undisputed custom.
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The prospect that other states will follow is born out by the steady rate
at which states have made the shift. Inthe 1980s, Florida, Mississippi, Minne-
sota, and Wyoming rejected customs, and New Hampshire, Oregon, Virginia,
and West Virginia adopted a reasonable-physician standard. In the 1990s,
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Nevada, and Wisconsin rejected conclu-
sive reliance on custom-based standards, and Indiana adopted a reasonable-
physician standard. There is no sign that the movement away from custom-
based standards has run out of momentum.
D. Failure to Enforce the Customary Standard of Care
Even in jurisdictions that continue to endorse a customary standard of
care, courts often give experts a considerable amount of latitude in the phras-
ing of their testimony. They do not insist that these experts prove that a
prevailing custom existed and that the defendant deviated from it. In a Geor-
gia case, for example, the court accepted an affidavit from the plaintiff's
expert merely stating that the defendant "departed from reasonable surgical
care."136 Similarly, an Hawaii court allowed a plaintiffto avoid a nonsuit with
testimony that "[m]y opinion is that there should have been some extra signs
besides the pulse." 137 In Arizona, too, a plaintiff reached the jury with testi-
mony that the defendant's conduct was not "reasonable." 513 Similar examples
exist in many other states purportedly retaining a customary standard of care.139
Although some courts have been stricter, 4 ° a fair amount of fudging appears
to be taking place. In the courthouse, plaintiffs often reach juries without
proof of deviation from customary norms.
These cases warn us not to overestimate the extent to which custom,
rather than reasonability, provides the actual standard of care in those states
that ostensibly endorse a customary standard of care. Many courts do not
insist on the descriptive (quantitative) proof of prevailing practices implicit
in a custom-based test and, instead, allow experts to offer evaluative (qualita-
tive) testimony about appropriate care. When the defendant and her experts
136. Sanders v. Ramo, 416 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct.App. 1992).
137. Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Haw. 198,206 (1953).
138. McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338,341 (Ariz. CtApp. 1986).
139. E.g., Heirs v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 729, 733 (Mo. 1992) (accepting testimony about
defendant's "failure to exercise that degree of skill and learning that an ordinarily careful and
prudent physician would have exercised"); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 605 (S.C.
1995) (affirming judgment based on expert's testimony that defendant had deviated from "the
standard of care").
140. E.g., Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A-2d 82, 86-88 (Me. 1974) (rejecting testimony that
defendant's conduct was "bad practice"); Kortus v. Jensen, 237 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Neb. 1976)
(rejecting testimony that plaintiff's expert would have acted differently).
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disagree with the plaintiffs experts, the jury chooses between them, just as it
does in other complex, expert-aided torts actions, such as those involving
airplane design or architectural negligence.
In theory, of course, the "respectable minority" rule should protect physi-
cians in cases in which physicians differ. The purpose ofthe rule is to prevent
the jury from deciding which approach is best. 1 ' However, courts typically
allow the jury to decide whether the defendant's school of thought is "respect-
able." Although a few courts have directed verdicts for defendants, 42 a close
reading of the respectable minority cases reveals that a directed verdict is
uncommon unless the plaintiff either has no expert,143 or the plaintiff s expert
fails to establish a prima facie case, as where the plaintiff's expert states only
that the defendant did not do what the expert would have done and does not
testify that the defendant's conduct fell below the applicable standard of
care." As long as the plaintiffs expert testifies that the defendant's conduct
did not meet the standard of care, then the jury decides whether the defen-
dant's approach was malpractice. 4 As a consequence, the modem function
of the respectable minority instruction is to remind the jury that more than one
approach may be reasonable, not to take the case away from the jury. 46
The twentieth century judicial retreat from reliance on local customs in
favor of a standard based either on national standards or the standards of
similar localities may have accentuated this tendency toward loose application
of the custom-based standard of care. 47 Given the variations in physician
141. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25 (explaining respectable minority rule).
142. E.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099,1102 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that trial
court granted dismissal when medical authority was divided), overruled by State Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1194 (Colo. 1994); Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa. Super.
117, 120-21 (Super. Ct. 1922) (noting that trial court directed verdict on divided medical prac-
tice).
143. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Bennett, 181 A. 558, 559 (Pa. 1935) (affirming directed
verdict when plaintiff did not have expert).
144. See, e.g., Kortus v. Jensen, 237 N.W. 2d 845,851-52 (Neb. 1976) (holding testimony
by plaintiff's expert about what he would have done did not constitute proof of malpractice).
145. See, e.g., Sprowl v. Ward, 441 So. 2d 898, 900 (Ala. 1983) (upholding jury verdict
for defendant); Watson v. McNamara, 424 N.W.2d 611,612 (Neb. 1988) (per curiam) (holding
that respectable minority rule does not preclude verdict for plaintiff if her expert contends that
defendant violated standard of care); Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 967-68 (Pa. 1992)
(holding that case goes to jury if plaintiff has made prima facie case despite testimony from
defendant's expert that defendant's approach was respectable); Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 472 A-2d 1083, 1091 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that, where plaintiff's and defen-
dant's experts each believed that other's approach would be malpractice, jury should decide
after being instructed that both approaches could be found to be proper).
146. See, e.g., Furey, 472 A-2d at 1091 (stating that jury could find both approaches
reasonable).
147. See supra text accompanying note 15 (noting disfavor of locality rules).
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practice patterns across the country, the notion of a national custom is far less
plausible than the notion of a local custom. Dr. Jack Wennberg, who did the
pioneering work on this topic, found the following:
[A] resident of New Haven, Connecticut, is about twice as likely to un-
dergo a coronary bypass operation as is a resident of Boston; for carotid
endarterectomy, the risks are the other way around. The numbers of knee
and hip replacements per capita are much more common among Bosto-
nians, while New Havenites experience substantially higher risks for
hysterectomy and back surgery.1'
Customs, therefore, vary widely from one community to another. In addition,
variability in patients, illnesses, and possible therapeutic responses often will
make the notion of an established custom a quaint fairy tale. 49 The economic
stratification of patients also acts as a barrier to the formation of stable cus-
toms.
1 50
Furthermore, even when a widely favored approach actually exists, ascer-
taining that custom at a reasonable cost may be impossible. In the real world
of malpractice litigation, expert witnesses speak from their experience and the
readily available literature. They do not know (and typically could not hope
to know) the actual percentage of physicians who would act as the defendant
did under the specific circumstances posed bythe patient's condition. Perhaps
cognizant of these obstacles to proof of deviation from established custom,
courts often do not require such proof.
To describe the standard of care in these courts as custom-based is to
paint an incomplete and misleading image of the law in action. When no
undisputed custom exists, the jury decides whether the defendant behaved
reasonably. Many physicians, of course, already know this fact from their
own experience. That experience may help to explain why physicians are not
comforted by the special protection theoretically conferred upon them by a
custom-based standard of care.
E. Summary
The era of uniform deference to physician norms clearly is over. Modem
malpractice law is moving slowly away from a custom-based standard of care
148. Jack E. Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-Making Process, 7 HEALTH
AFFAiRS 99,99 (1988).
149. See MARK-AHAIL, MAKINGMEDICALSPImNINGDECISIONS 84-88(1997)(conclud-
ing that individual treatment decisions are complex and individualized); Henderson & Siliciano,
supra note 8, at 1390 (concluding that "highly differentiated nature of medical problems" is
obstacle to formation of useful medical custom); McCoid, supra note 8, at 584 (stating that
"there is no standard patient").
150. See Henderson & Siliciano, supra note 8, at 1393-94 ("[E]conomic stratification of
the patient population precludes formation of a stable unitary custom.").
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and toward a reasonable physician standard. The movement has been gradual
and persistent. And it is not over.
The present state of affairs is complicated, but the trend is clear. One
quarter ofthe states expressly have rejected deference to customary standards.
Another twenty-percent have rephrased their standard of care in terms of
reasonability rather than custom. Although the commitment of this last
group of states has yet to be tested directly, these states certainly cannot be
classified as custom-based states. In addition, confusing or contradictory case
law in seven other states precludes confident classification.' l That leaves
fewer than half of the states with law that clearly endorses a custom-based
standard of care. Even in these states, the authority of the custom-based
standard of care often is illusory. Many courts in states with a custom-based
standard do not appear to enforce it. The hegemony of custom-based stan-
dards is over.
Will more states move to a reasonability standard? Given the addition
of eight states in the 1980s and five more in the 1990s, that seems like a
reasonable prediction.
F. A Caution About Interpretation
The classifications undertaken here required the personal interpretation
of judicial and legislative text. Even under ideal circumstances, a consider-
able amount of discretion is inherent in this endeavor. Many of the judicial
opinions surveyed for this Article had a proclivity for unclear or inconsistent
language, sometimes using terms from both tests interchangeably. Indeed,
American courts historically have believed that compliance with customary
practice defined reasonable care for professionals. As a result, the language
used in many opinions contains elements of both formulations.
When I have read the cases, I have tried to discern whether the language
of the court, taken as a whole but with deep respect for specific phrases,
contemplates a standard of care based on what physicians actually do or
whether, instead, the language would permitthe jury to decide what a reason-
able physician would have done. This distinction is the difference between
deciding what physicians "do" and determining what they "ought to do." It
often is a subtle line and is reflected, for example, in the difference between
the burden of proving deviation from "accepted" practice (custom) and
deviation from "acceptable" (not necessarily customary) practice. Examples
151. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74 (noting ambiguities in Pennsylvania); upra
notes 75-98 (noting inconsistencies in California and Ohio); supra notes 99-100 (noting ambi-
guities in Oklahoma); supra notes 120-23 (noting inconsistencies in Arizona); infra notes 159-
60 (noting inconsistencies in Georgia and Iowa).
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of customary terminology include tests that oblige physicians to conform with
"usual" or "accepted" '52 practices orto use such care as physicians "ordinarily
have and exercise."' 53 Examples of reasonable care terminology include not
only the phrasing described above but also tests that judge physicians by what
an "ordinarily careful physician" would do"5 or requiring the care that is
"ordinarily exercised by a reasonably skillful, careful, and prudent health care
professional.' 55
This Article uses a functional test for ascribing meaning to these texts by
asking whether the stated test would enable a plaintiffs attorney to avoid
dismissal by offering the testimony of an expert who disapproves of the
defendant's actions but does not testify about actual prevailing practices. If
the stated test seems likely to permit expert testimony that the defendant's
conduct was "inappropriate," "unreasonable," or "unacceptable," then this
Article classifies that state as a reasonable care state.
152. See Aiello v. Muhlenberg Reg'l Med. Ctr., 733 A.2d 433, 438 (N.J. 1999) (using
"accepted" interchangeably with "normally"); see also Joseph IL King, Jr., In Search of a
Standard of Care for the MedicalProfession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 1213, 1236 (1975) (proposing that standard of"accepted" care be employed as alternative
to either the custom-based standard or reasonable care standard). Professor King seems to
contemplate that any challenge against customary practices would have to be based on authori-
tative medical studies or a respected body of medical opinion. If so, then his "accepted practice"
test would be much more protective of physicians than a reasonable physician test. The test
would permit attack of unreasonable norms that are out-of-date, but not necessarily unreason-
able norms prompted by provider self-interest In effect, it would represent a twist on the
respectable minority rule. Plaintiffs could not challenge majority practices unless a respectable
minority ofphysicians also condemned them.
As yet, there is little evidence that courts are adopting an "accepted practice" standard as
a distinct third standard of care. The most likely jurisdiction to do so may be King's home state
of Tennessee. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115(A) (1980) (stating that claimant in malprac-
tice action shall prove "the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the
profession"). Yet, it is not clear that the Tennessee courts have applied this test differently from
a customary care test. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hill, 770 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tenn. Ct App. 1988)
(excluding testimony about what expert would do and his opinion of what should have been
done); King, supra, at 1236 n.101 (noting that how courts will interpret statute remains to be
seen).
153. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-484 (1993) (requiring care ordinarily exercised in similar case);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540 (Michie 1996) (requiring care "ordinarily exercised... by health
care providers in the field").
154. See OR. REV. STAT. § 677.095 (1997) ("Aphysician... hasthe dutytouse that degree
of care... that is used by ordinarily careful physicians."). The phrase "ordinarily prudent"
often is used interchangeably with "reasonable" in ordinary negligence cases. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1975) (describing reasonable man as "ordinarily
prudent").
155. VT. STAT. NN. § 1908 (1999). Butsee infra text accompanying note 157 (discussing
"care ... expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider").
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In a number of states, the ambiguities precluded classification. Recall the
preceding discussion of Pennsylvania, California, Ohio and Arizona. 5
Arizona, for example, has a statute that requires physicians to use the
"care... expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider."'57 This
language certainly suggests a reasonability test. Despite the statute, however,
this Article does not classify Arizona as a reasonable physician state because
that does not appear to be the current judicial understanding.15 8 In two other
states, Georgia 59 and Iowa,"6 the governing language is very ambiguous, too
murky to classify confidently. Despite this effort to interpret the cases cau-
tiously, the subjectivity involved in these interpretations means that readers
should treat the numbers stated here only as preliminary estimates.
In addition to the subjectivity inherent in interpreting the cases, this
survey was limited by its reliance on published opinions and statutes. Be-
cause of this reliance, it cannot reflect the understandings and practices oftrial
bench and bar in the various jurisdictions. Their understandings will deter-
mine how malpractice law actually operates.
As a result, this survey should be understood only as a first cut at under-
standing our evolving malpractice case law. Further research is necessary,
especially regarding trial practices in the individual states. Nevertheless, the
findings reported here illuminate a significant and previously unrecognized
evolution in doctrine-a trend that has shown no signs of abating. Even if the
numbers reported here are partially discounted to account for the uncertainties
in the classification process, they remain strikingly different from the conven-
tional understanding of modem malpractice law.
Ml. Explaining the Shift
The courts rejecting a custom-based standard of care typically observe
that any industry can have some unreasonable customs. They have not,
156. See supra text accompanying notes 75-98 (California and Ohio); supra notes 71-74
(Pennsylvania); supra notes 120-23 (Arizona).
157. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-563 (1989) (emphasis added).
158. See supra text accompanying note 120 (addressing test in Arizona).
159. Georgia has both a statute and a case that appear to prefer reasonability to custom. See
GA. CODE AN. § 51-1-27 (1996) (requiring "reasonable degree of skill and care"); Pace v.
Cochran, 86 SR. 934,936 (Ga. 1915) (noting that "recognized methods ... may be considered"
along with other evidence). However, the more recent cases have not given the statute this
interpretation. E.g., Killingsworth v. Poon, 307 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (stating
test as care ordinarily employed by profession generally); Chapman v. Radcliffe, 162 S.E. 651,
652 (Ga. Ct App. 1932) (same); Fincherv. Davis, 108 SE. 905,906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921) (same).
160. See Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 908 (Iowa 1976) (requiring "such reasonable
care and skill as is exercised by the ordinary physician of good standing" (quoting MeGulpin
v. Bessmer, 42 N.W.2d 121,128 (Iowa 1950))).
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however, explained why this argument is more persuasive in the last quarter
of this century than it was in the first three. Part of the explanation probably
lies in the public's widespread loss of faith in medicine and other institutions
and part in the larger movement of late twentieth century tort law toward an
unencumbered reasonability regime.
A. Judicially Stated Rationales
The courts expressly rejecting deference to custom in medical malprac-
tice typically have reiterated the basic tort notion that an industry is not
permitted to set its own standard of care." Often, the opinions repeat Judge
Hand's argument that "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adop-
tion of new and available devices.' 62  "Negligence," said the Wyoming
Supreme Court, "cannot be excused on the grounds that others practice the
same kind of negligence."'63 Otherwise, said the Colorado Supreme Court,
"the profession itself would be permitted to set the measure of its own legal
liability, even though that measure might be far below a level of care readily
attainable." The unstated conclusion in these opinions is that deference to
customary standards would place the profession above the law. 65 The solu-
tion to the problems posed by the complexity of medical malpractice cases,
courts have concluded, is the same one employed in other complex tort
actions." Courts can require that the plaintiff offer expert testimony to
educate the jury.167
161. See, e.g., Advincula v. United Blood Seres., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1027 (11. 1996)
(noting that custom is not conclusive of proper care (citing Darling v. Charleston Community
Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253,257 (11. 1965) (quoting The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d
Cir. 1932), cert denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932)))); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272
(Wis. 1996) (noting that customary conduct is not dispositive of reasonable care).
162. The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,740 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
163. Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768,772 (Wyo. 1981).
164. United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520 (Colo. 1992), aff'd, 827 P.2d
509 (Colo. 1992).
165. See, e.g., id. (noting that courts, not profession, decide due care (quoting The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740)); Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253,257
(111. 1965) (same).
166. See, e.g., Ray v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 696 A2d 399,403 (D.C. 1996) (noting
that custom is also inconclusive in complex commercial transactions where expert testimony
is required (citing Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 199 (D.C. 1991)));
Kissinger v. Turner, 727 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("We see no reason for a
different rule in medical malpractice cases.").
167. See, e.g., Ray, 696 A.2d at 404 (requiring plaintiff to produce expert testimony);
Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772-73 (Wyo. 1981) (stating that experts are needed to
explain technical conduct to jury).
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The courts have not, however, explained why the once-persuasive argu-
ments made in favor of a custom-based standard no longer are convincing."e
Their failure to explain the timing of this shift is disappointing because a
plausible argument can be made that the custom-based standard of care no
longer is desirable. For example, these courts have not discussed the modem
research proving that physician practices vary considerably from one locale
to another, making talk of national customs seem naive. 69 Nor have the
courts defended their abandonment of customary standards as a way of freeing
cost-conscious, socially responsible physicians from the profligate overtreat-
ment encouraged by fee-for-service reimbursement.170 Neither have they sug-
gested that a reasonability test is necessary to protect patients from the cus-
toms that managed care plans might otherwise be tempted to adopt. Indeed,
the opinions reveal little conscious awareness of the revolutionary structural
changes that currently are occurring in medicine.
Why then are courts withdrawing a privilege once conferred upon the
medical profession? Although many factors may play a role in this shift in
standards, loss of faith in the "professionalism" of medicine is probably an
important one. Another is the movement of tort law away from specialized
duties.
B. An Unspoken Loss of Trust
Over the second half of this century, courts appear to have lost their faith
that physicians are sufficiently different from engineers, truck drivers, product
manufacturers and other businesses to justify the many special legal privileges
previously accorded physicians. Gradually, the courts have stripped physi-
cians of many ofthe legal privileges that once set them apart, such as "profes-
168. Advocates of custom-based standards believe that they offer advantages such as
superior administrability, resistance to hindsight bias, escape from the cognitive limits of the
jury, market-based identification of efficient safety levels, and a reduced burden on the medical
profession. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 189 (discussing custom based standard); see
also supra note 29 (citing sources defending custom-based standard).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55 (describing impediments to customary
practices).
170. Commentators have debated whether the customary standard of care is a threat to
these physicians. Compare Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health Care Cost
Containment, 17 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 347,348-49 (1989) (expressing confidence that
doctrines like respectable minority rule would protect these physicians), with Danzon, supra
note 28, at 493 (noting conflict between custom-based standard of care and cost-efficiency), E.
Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care,
59 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (noting conflict between custom-based standard and cost-
reform), and Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost
Containment Lessonsfor Reformersfrom the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1302
(1994) (stating that custom-based standard of care would make cost-based reform risky).
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sional" immunity from the antitrust laws and protection from "corporate"
competition. Modem tort law's reluctance to allow physicians to determine
their own standard of care is merely the most recent manifestation of this
larger trend away from special privileges.
1. Privilege and Trust
One hundred fifty years ago, physicians enjoyed neither exalted social
status nor legal privilege.17' In tort law, they were held to the same standard
of reasonable care applied to other negligence actions.'72 During the ensuing
one hundred years, however, the status and power of physicians changed
dramatically. They obtained unprecedented social authority and virtually
unregulated power over both the practice of medicine and its finances.113
Their claim to authority arose from a combination of expertise and trustwor-
thiness.1
74
As Paul Starr noted in his highly-regarded sociological study of the
medical profession, medicine increasingly was perceived as, and eventually
became, a profession based on advances in science and technology.1 75 Scien-
tific knowledge was respected and provided a powerful claim to authority.176
At the same time, physicians differentiated themselves from other schools
of healing by adopting an ethical code that affirmed the supremacy of patient
interests over more base economic concerns. 77 Medicine's formal dedication
to patient welfare was essential to its achievement of "professional" status.
Sociologists studying the emergence of professions in this country have
concluded that expertise alone was insufficient unless accompanied by a
171. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICIN 81-92
(1982) (providing historical analysis of physician status and privilege).
172. See Silver, supra note 8, at 1205-11 (stating that physicians were held to standard of
ordinary care).
173. See STARR, supra note 171, at 142 (noting rise of authority and status).
174. See id. at 15 (describing authority of physicians); David Mechanic, The Functions and
Limitations of Trust in the Provision ofMedical Care,23 . HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 661,664
(1998) (linking authority to trust); William M. Sullivan, What Is Left of Professionalism After
Managed Care?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 7, 8 (1999) (noting trust in
standards of profession).
175. STARR, supra note 171, at 4, 18-19, 141-42 Oinking medicine to science and technol-
ogy).
176. At the same time, the urbanization and industrialization of American life necessitated
increasing reliance on experts. Id. at 18. As people came to trust science, they desired the
advice of experts like physicians. Id. at 18-19.
177. See Edward B. Hlirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations:
The Need for a New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIx 3, 8 (1996) (stating that development
of ethical code differentiated physicians).
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"service rather than profit orientation.""'  Only then could the occupation
obtain the social and legal privileges associated with the professions." 9 This
fidelity to the customer distinguishes a profession from a trade. As Talcott
Parsons stated in his classic work, The Social System:
The "ideology" of the [medical] profession lays great emphasis on the
obligation of the physician to put the "welfare of the patient" above his
personal interests, and regards "commercialism" as the most serious and
insidious evil with which it has to contend... This attitude is, of course,
shared withthe other professions, but it is perhaps mostpronounced inthe
medical case than in any single one except perhaps the clergy."'
Over the early decades ofthis century, physicians adroitly converted their
professional status into social, economic and legal privileges."' Starr de-
scribes this era as one of both the "surrender of private judgment" and the
emergence of professional "sovereignty."1"2 Nowhere is the surrender of
judgment more obvious than in judicial deference to medical customs. 18 3
Deference to prevailing practices was not the only legal privilege con-
ferred upon physicians. Physicians also were widely believed to be immune
from the anti-trust laws." 4 Furthermore, the prohibitions on "corporate
practice" protected them from HMO-like competition. 5 In this era of physi-
cian sovereignty, trust in physicians substituted for legal supervision.18 6
178. STARR, supra note 171, at 15.
179. See Mechanic, supra note 174, at 667 (viewing medicine as "selfless endeavor"); Sulli-
van, supra note 174, at 8 (noting that professional was expected to subordinate financial gain).
180. TALcoTrPARsoNs, THESOcIALSYSTEM435(1951). Under this view ofthe doctor-
patient relationship, physicians were on the patient's side and did not view their relationship
with the patient as an arms-length transaction. See Pearson, supra note 29, at 536 (describing
traditional view of physician-patient relationship).
181. See STARR, supra note 171, at 142 (noting that physicians capitalized on new
conditions); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. RaV. 431,445-47 (1988) (describing many legal
victories enjoyed by physicians).
182. STARR, supra note 171,at 10, 23.




185. See People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1938) (stating that
corporations may not engage in practice of medicine); STARR, supra note 171, at 198-234
(describing struggle of physicians to avoid corporate dominance).
186. See Pearson, supra note 29, at 537 (finding no need for court supervision of physi-
cians and reasoning that profession is able to police itself). Privilege also had its costs. For
instance, the physician's status as a professional prohibited her from disclaiming tort liability.
See Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort Contract andManaged Care, 1998 U. ILL.
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An abiding trust in the professionalism and faithfulness of physicians
resonated throughout the early legal commentary defending or explaining the
customary standard of care. In his 1942 article Custom and Negligence, for
example, Clarence Morris expressed his confidence that doctors as a class
were "more likely to exert their best efforts than drovers, railroads and mer-
chants.' 8 Similarly, in Allan McCoid's classic 1959 article on the medical
standard of care, McCoid contended that physicians "should be free to operate
in the best interests of the patient."'88 Post-hoc judicial supervision, he feared,
would interfere with that freedom and thus prevent doctors from practicing
sound medicine. In an earlier piece, McCoid concluded that courts assume
"that the doctor is exercising his skill for the benefit of the patient [and]
inasmuch as this assumption is a basic tenet of medical science it seems a
proper one.1
189
Later commentary echoed the same themes. In his 1976 defense of
custom-based norms, Richard Pearson summarized the underlying logic of the
rule as follows: "There is no need for courts to act as a source of pressure to
compel the medical profession to give adequate consideration to patient safety
and well-being, since the forces that operate within the medical profession
make such extra-professional pressure unnecessary."' ' ° Prosser, too, believed
that the rule rested on "the healthy respect which the courts have had for the
learning of a fellow profession, and their reluctance to overburden it with
liability based on uneducated judgment."'9' Another scholar, James Hender-
son, concluded that "[a]n important reason for allowing the medical profession
to set its own standards is that courts can assume these standards are adequate
to protect the interests of patients."'"
Even today, courts retaining a custom-based standard of care emphasize
their respect for their fellow professionals. 'We defer," said the South
Carolina Supreme Court, "to the collective wisdom" of physicians."3 Like-
wise, the Kansas Supreme Court based its ruling on its faith in "the medical
profession's own recognition of its obligation to maintain its standards."'94
L. REV. 885, 889 (noting that physician's status as professional rendered invalid contractual
disclaimer of liability).
187. Morris, supra note 8, at 1164.
188. McCoid, supra note 8, at 608.
189. Allan EL McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liabilily for Unauthorized Medical Treatment,
41 MIIw. L. REV. 381,431-32 (1957).
190. Pearson, supra note 29, at 537. He also notes that this trust is eroding. Id. at 537-38.
191. KEETONET AL.,supra note 1, § 32, at 189.
192. Henderson, supra note 29, at 926.
193. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323,326 (S.C. 1989).
194. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093,1107 (Ka. 1960).
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The most interesting discussion of the rationale for custom-based stan-
dards appears in a 1985 Arizona product liability decision. In Rossel v. Volks-
wagen of America,95 Volkswagen contended that its automobile designers
were professionals whose conduct should be measured against industry norms.
Unpersuaded, the Arizona Supreme Court explained that it would delegate its
standard-setting power "only when the nature of the group and its special
relationship with its clients assures society that those standards will be set
with primary regard to protection of the public, rather than to such consider-
ations as increased profitability."'96
To be sure, faith in physicians is not the only rationale courts offer for
their deference to physician norms. Courts also emphasize the difficulty of
judicially supervising highly complex medical judgments and the burden that
a standard based on reasonability might impose on the profession. However,
their willingness to defer to the customs of physicians, while not deferring to
the customs of other scientific occupations, like architects, engineers, and
aircraft designers, suggests a special confidence that physicians will place
patient welfare over profits and other conflicting interests.
2. The Public's Loss of Trust
Popular faith in medicine has declined in the last fifty years. This loss
oftrust may help to explain why courts are less willing now than in years past
to defer to medical customs.
Since 1966, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research has tracked
how confident Americans are about leaders in various fields. In the initial
year of the survey, Americans had a 73% level of confidence in medicine,
well above the average for other fields (40%).'" However, the confidence
level in medicine has decreased fairly steadily ever since and in 1993 was at
an all time low of 22%.'J The year 1993 marked the first time that the aver-
age level of confidence of other fields (23%) surpassed that of medicine."9
In a 1993 American Medical Association survey, 69% of the respondents
felt that doctors were "too interested in making money" and 70% believed that
"people are beginning to lose faith in doctors."'" Both figures reflected an
increase of roughly 10% since the early 1980s, when the questions were first
195. 709 P.2d 517 (Ariz. 1985).
196. Rossel v. Volkswagen ofAm., 709 P.2d 517,523 (Ariz. 1985) (emphasis added).
197. Robert J. Blendon et al., Bridging the Gap Between Expert and Public Views on
Health Care Reform, 269 JAMA 2573, 2576 fig. 4 (1993).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. AmmEICANMED. AW'N, PUBUC OPINION ONHEALTH CARE ISSUES 21-22(1993).
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posed. In a 1992 AMA survey, 56% of respondents believed that "doctors
don't care about people as much as they used to."2Ol That figure has remained
fairly stable since the early 1980s.2'
Money appears to play a role in the rise of cynicism. In a 1996 national
poll, 82% of respondents believed that medical care had become a big busi-
ness and that the industry put profits ahead ofpatients.° 3 In addition, Ameri-
cans feel that they do not receive much value for their health care dollar. In
one study, for example, a question asked respondents to rank the value of 50
purchases, such as televisions, restaurants, and credit charges.2" Of the 50
categories, hospital charges ranked last, health insurance ranked 46th, and
doctors' fees ranked 41st.2"5 The 1992 AMA study uncovered similar senti-
ments. In that study, 68% of the people polled disagreed with the view that
"doctors fees are usually reasonable."2" This figure was 10-20% higher than
it was during the 1980s.2" By 1997, 75% felt that doctors' fees usually were
not reasonable."' Based on polls like these, researchers believe that physi-
cians and the health care industry are losing the respect of the public.
Scholars, too, have been less sympathetic to physicians as the century has
progressed. Medical ethicists, sociologists, and historians no longer routinely
take the viewpoint of physicians. Instead, their work has increasingly de-
picted the medical profession as "dominating, monopolizing [and] self-inter-
ested."20i
This loss of trust in physicians parallels a general decline in the public's
trust of others.210 For example, one study found that the proportion of people
who believe that most people are trustworthy fell from 58% in 1960 to 37%
in 1993 .211 Another survey found that the proportion of Americans who have
201. ARICANMED.ASs'N,PHYICIANANDPUBICOPINIONONHEALTHCAREISSUES25
(1992).
202. Id. at 26.
203. National Coalition on Health Care, HowAmericans Perceive the Health Care System:
A Report on a NationalSurvey, 23(4) J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE 12, 17 tbl. 3 (Summer 1997).
204. Blendon et al., supra note 197, at 2576 fig. 3.
205. Id.
206. AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, supra note 200, at 25.
207. Id. at 26.
208. AMM1 CAN MED. ASS'N, PUBLIC OPInON ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 4 (1997).
209. STARR, supra note 171, at 392. Feminists have been especially critical of organized
medicine. See id. at 391-93 (noting feminist criticisms of medical profession).
210. See Blendon et al., supra note 197, at 2576 fig. 4 (noting general erosion of trust);
David Mechanic, Changing Medical Organization and the Erosion of Trust, 74 MILBANK Q.
171, 171-72 (1996) (same).
211. Mechanic, supra note 210, at 171-72 (citing S.M. Lipset, Malaise and Resiliency in
America, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 4 (1995)).
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a great deal of confidence in American institutions fell from 40% in 1965 to
23% in 1993.212 This general trend certainly has influenced the public's loss
of trust in medicine.
In addition, medicine itself has undergone changes that may have accen-
tuated the problem. Increasingly, medicine is delivered by for-profit institu-
tions.213  Furthermore, physicians themselves often are entrepreneurs with
assembly-line waiting rooms and remunerative procedures. Doctors some-
times run ancillary businesses that call into question the hoary image of
unerring attention to patient welfare. Most recently, managed care has begun
to restrict the freedom of patients to choose their own physicians and the
physicians' freedom to choose their preferred treatment.214
Other factors may also play a role. For example, patients are more
sophisticated about medicine and the media has made them more aware of
medical error.215 Increasingly, hired specialists with whom patients have no
prior relationship provide medical treatment for Americans.216 In addition,
Americans feel threatened by medical care cost increases.211 It also is per-
ceived as limiting access to costly treatments.
Cumulatively, these phenomena help to explain why medical profession-
als have lost the extraordinary level of confidence that they enjoyed thirty
212. Blendon et al., supra note 197, at 2576 fig. 4.
213. See Mechanic, supra note 210, at 172, 178. A recent study indicates that not-for-
profit HMOs had uniformly better outcomes data than for-profit HMOs. See David U. Himmel-
stein et al., Quality of Care in Investor-O wned vs. Not-for-Profit HMOs, 282 JAMA 159, 159
(1999) (concluding that "[i]nvestor-owned HMOs deliver lower quality of care than not-for-
profit plans"). Nonprofit IMOs also have characteristics that are more likely than those of for-
profit HMOs to engender trust. Among these characteristics are the presence of community
board members and a reduced ability to profit from their patients. See John V. Jacobi, Mission
and Markets in Health Care: Protecting Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 1431,1467-68 (1997) (listing trust-inspiring characteristics of nonprofit HMOs).
214. SeegeneralIGEORGEANDERs,HEALTHAGAINSTWEALTH. HMOsANDTiBREAK-
DOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996) (describing consumer experiences with HMOs); Bradford H.
Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era, HEALTHAFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
34 (discussing prospective sources of trust in HMOs); David Mechanic, Managed Care as a
Target ofDistrust, 277 JAMA 1810 (1997) (discussing public distrust of HMOs).
215. See Fala, supra note 28, at 252 (discussing heightened sophistication of American
patients); Mechanic, supra note 210, at 172 and 178-79 (same). The public is also less mystified
by the mysteries of medicine. See Fala, supra note 28, at 252 (noting increased public aware-
ness of medical techniques).
216. See Fala, supra note 28, at 252 (noting demise of family doctor and rise of special-
ists); Pearson, supra note 29, at 537 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTI, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3 (1973)) (noting rise of
specialists and sub-specialists). Pearson also notes that the public hears frequent reports about
Medicare fraud and unnecessary surgery. Pearson, supra note 29, at 537.
217. Blendon et al., supra note 197, at 2574.
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years ago. As the public becomes even more aware ofthe financial incentives
that managed care systems give to physicians to make them cost conscious,
this deference may erode even more.218
This loss of trust has occurred even though most Americans view their
own care as satisfactory. A number of surveys have found a personal satisfac-
tion rate above 70%.219 Researchers have hypothesized that respondents,
although happy with their own care, worry about the care provided to
others." ° Other scholars speculate that increased public pessimism arises out
of fears about the availability of care for themselves in the future. 2" Ameri-
cans are, it seems, both satisfied with the past and frightened about the
future.m This ebbing of stature does not mean that Americans dislike physi-
cians.m However, it does mean that physicians have lost much of their
priesthood and, with it, their claim to special legal privileges.
Even more important than the raw numbers is the trend revealed by the
decisions. The slow but steady judicial abandonment of deference medical
custom began in earnest in the 1970s, continued in the 1980s, and retained its
vitality through the 1990s. Showing no signs of exhaustion, this movement
could become the majority position early in the next century.
3. Judicial Trust and the Loss of Privilege
Judges, too, are less willing to trust physicians to regulate themselves.
Over the past forty years, courts have abandoned many of the important legal
privileges once conferred upon the medical profession. For example, physi-
218. See Mechanic, supra note 210, at 179 (opining that managed care may further erode
trust in physicians).
219. See Blendon et al., supra note 197, at 2575 (placing satisfaction rate at 74%); Law-
rence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, Public Opinion's Tilt Against Private Enterprise,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1994, at 285, 286-87 (placing satisfaction rate at over 80%); National
Coalition on Health Care, supra note 203, at 13 tbl. 1 (73% agree or somewhat agree). One
study found that only 10% had lost faith in their own doctors, but 70% felt that "people" were
losing faith in physicians. Jacobs & Shapiro, supra, at 288.
220. See Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 219, at 288-89 (noting public concern over quality
of health care provided to others).
221. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH
AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 80, 81 (arguing that Americans feel their HMOs will fail them). We
base our fears on the publicized misfortunes of a few. Id.
222. Cf RossK. GoldbergRegainingPublic Trust, HEALTAFF.,Nov.-Dee. 1998 at 138,
138 (noting one managed care executive's explanation that, "[W]e are left to pine for a time
when physicians made house calls and pizza didn't").
223. To the contrary, the public still seems to sympathize with physicians, at least in the
context of medical malpractice actions. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort
Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming) (reviewing evidence
of anti-plaintiff bias in medical malpractice actions).
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cians once were assumed to be immune from the antitrust laws; however, that
privilege ended in 1975.24 Earlier in this century, courts protected physicians
from corporate competition through the "corporate practice" doctrine.2" That
doctrine since has withered and is ignored widely.226 In addition, HMO
enabling acts have blunted its sting.227 Thirty years ago, physicians had few
restrictions on their business arrangements. Today, state and federal laws
prohibit or limit self-referral, referral fees, and other forms of financial fraud
and abuse.22
Tort law has undergone a similar transition. Courts no longer allow
physicians to take shelter behind local customs.229 Instead, the norms ofphysi-
cians in similar communities or, in the case of specialists, national standards,
govern medical duties. ° In the 1970s, courts recognized the doctrine of
informed consent, which obligates physicians to share their decision-making
power with their patients.23' This trend has affected hospitals, also, as they
have lost their long-standing, de facto freedom from vicarious or direct mal-
practice liability."2 From this perspective, it is the longevity of the custom-
based standard of care that is remarkable, not its current loss of support.
224. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (finding no antitrust
exemption for professionals); CURRANETAL.,supra note 15, at 1277-78 (discussing this finding).
225. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 5.10, at 285-90 (discussing corporate practice
doctrine).
226. See id. at 290-91 (noting that corporate practice doctrine rarely is enforced).
227. E.g., Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,42 U.S.C. §§ 300(e)-300(eX9)
(1994). See Thomas L. Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does it Take to Fix the Health Care
System?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1825,1830 n.12 (1997) (reviewing RICHARID A EPSTEIN, MORTAL
PERIL: OURINALmNABLERIGtr TO HEALTH CARE? (1997)) (noting that enactment of HMO Act
signalled Congress's conception of health care as industry, rather than profession).
228. See generally FTROOWET AL., supra note 18, at 618-20.
229. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 865, 871 (Miss. 1985) (requiring Mississippi
doctors to follow national standards of care, not local ones); FURROW ET AL., supra note 8,
§ 6.2, at 360 (discussing standard of care for general practitioners).
230. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.2, at 360 (discussing standard of care for
general practitioners).
231. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170,181 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1957) (discussing duty of doctor to reveal facts "necessary to form the basis of [a
patient's] intelligent consent"); FURROW ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.2, at 409-47 (discussing
informed consent). The shift away from physician autonomy is most prominent in those juris-
dictions that use a disclosure standard based, not on what medical custom would require doctors
to disclose, but rather on what a reasonable patient would want to know under the circum-
stances. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-85 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying
patient-based standard); Fala, supra note 28, at 253 (noting disclosure standard based on patient
expectation, rather than on medical custom).
232. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253,257 (111.
1965) (finding that plaintiff can hold hospital responsible for malpractice of its taff); FURROW
ET AL., supra note 8, § 7.1-7.3, at 448-67 (discussing hospital liability).
200
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The lesson of history is that expertise is not sufficient to preserve legal
privilege. The expertise of physicians is more advanced than ever before.
Judicial scrutiny of medical decisions has never been more difficult. Techni-
cal expertise alone, however, provides a much less powerful claim to public
legitimacy than expertise combined with a credible promise that the patient's
interests will come first."
C. The General Trend in Tort Law Towards a Single Standard of
Reasonable Care
The weakening of support for a special standard of care for professionals
also is consistent with the gradual movement of twentieth century tort law
away from an array of special duties and immunities tailored for specific social
contexts and toward a general and more flexible obligation of reasonable
care. 4 For example, the law has partially or totally abrogated charitable and
family immunities that once insulated many people from negligence liability. 5
Courts and legislatures also have modified special duty rules like those govern-
ing rescue, 6 landowner obligations, 7 and recovery for emotional distress"s
in ways that expose more parties to the general duty of reasonable care.
Until now, experts have believed that the law governing medical malprac-
tice litigation escaped this general movement toward a single standard of
reasonable care." 9 That belief was mistaken. As the professional paradigm
has weakened, the custom-based standard of care gradually is yielding to the
fundamental tort standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.
233. See Sullivan, supra note 174, at 10 (opining that professional legitimacy rests on trust,
not merely on scientific knowledge). Elliott Krouse views this regulation of medicine as part
of a general tendency to bring professions within the control ofthe state. ELLIo1r KRoUsE, THE
DEATH OF THE GUsDS 36-49 (1996).
234. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability,
15 GA. L. REV. 963, 963-77 (1981) (discussing growth of negligence principle and abrogation
of special classifications and immunities).
235. See KEETONETAL.,supra note 1, § 131-35, at 1032-73 (surveying immunities).
236. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 33948 (Cal.
1976) (finding that psychiatrist has duty to warn potential victims of dangerous patient when
"special relationship" exists between doctor and either patient or victim); Madden v. C & K
Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Mo. 1988) (finding that business owner has duty
to protect invitees from foreseeable torts of third parties).
237. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (discarding common-law
classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee in favor of simple, unified negligence standard).
238. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,921 (Cal. 1968) (allowing emotional distress
recovery to mother who witnessed child's death, but was in no danger herself); Bass v. Nooney
Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768-73 (Mo. 1983) (abandoning impact rule in emotional distress cases).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35,42-45 (noting widely held belief that medi-
cal malpractice recovery depends on showing deviation from medical custom).
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IV Implications
What does the evidence of an evolving standard of care augur for the
future?
1. Malpractice law may merge with the fabric of negligence law. Only
a decade ago, the American Law Institute and prominent legal scholars were
articulating the case for regulating medical malpractice disputes with a unique
regime of no-fault, exclusive enterprise liability. 4 Although this idea had
considerable merit, it never generated significant judicial or legislative sup-
port. In the meantime, the courts gradually are removing the cornerstone upon
which the distinct field of malpractice law has been built - the customary
standard of care. If more courts join this trend, malpractice law will merge
into the basic fabric of negligence law.
2. Judges and juries will have a heightened responsibility to scrutinize
expert testimony. In a world free of the restrictions implicit in a custom-based
standard of care, the temptation to employ professional experts whose views
are well outside of the mainstream will entice plaintiffs' lawyers. As a result,
judges and juries will have an important responsibility to scrutinize closely the
credentials and testimony of the plaintiffs' experts.
3. Physicians and their managed care plans may have more freedom to
abandon the costly practices produced by fee-for-service medicine.241 If
240. SeeREPoRTERS'STuDY, THEAMRICANLAWINSnTurTE,2ENTERPRisERESPONSIBIL-
fTY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 487-516 (1991) (outlining rationale for no-fault medical malpractice
compensation system); PAUL C. WELER. ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACICE: MEDICAL
INURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 145-52 (1993) (same).
241. Although at least one commentator has suggested that doctrines like the respectable
minority rule would provide courts with the flexibility to protect cost-effective care, e.g., Hall,
supra note 170, courts have not yet employed these doctrines to protect deviations from custom-
ary practices motivated by economic, rather than therapeutic, concerns. See Jonathan 3. Frankel,
Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lesson for Reformers
from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1326 n.104 (1994) (commenting that courts
do not use respectable minority rule to deviate standard of care for economic reasons). During
the fee-for-service era, the medical standard of care was widely believed to sanction the use of
all means available, without regard to cost See, e.g., Frankel, supra, at 1301 (noting that under
fee-for-service system, doctors provided care that yielded "some positive benefit" but was not
socially cost-effective); Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light ofMedical Cost-
Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004,1009-10 (1985) (commenting that ability ofdoctors to bill third
parties for patient care encourages them to order "all potentially relevant procedures"). Com-
mentators concerned about the capacity of custom-based standards to accommodate cost-
conscious medicine typically have recommended that courts enforce contractual waivers of the
customary standard of care. See, e.g., Clark Havighurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of
Care, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (1987) (advocating allowing consumers to consent to
deviations in customary standards in return for lower prices); Henderson & Siliciano, supra note
8, at 1392-93, 1396-1400 (arguing that strict inability to modify standard of care contractually
is inconsistent with already existing variance in healthcare based on ability to pay). Judicial
adoption of a reasonable-physician standard of care provides an alternative means of protecting
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courts define reasonable physician behavior in the same risk-utility terms with
which they have defined reasonable care in ordinary tort actions,242 then. cost-
conscious changes in clinical practices will be defensible (albeit risky) even
if they depart from fee-for-service customs. If, for example, new studies
prove that past practices are not beneficial, then conscientious physicians who
abandon them can defend themselves without fear that they will fall outside
of the "respectable minority" rule.
4. The reasonable physician standard may establish afloor below which
cost containment practices cannot descend absent an enforceable agreement
to modify the standard ofcare. America has leftthe task oftaming health care
costs to the marketplace.243 Tort liability certainly will be a part of any com-
prehensive strategy for policing that marketplace. A reasonable physician
standard of care provides the flexibility needed to evaluate customs imposed
on patients by managed care organizations.
5. Judicial resistance to contractual modification ofthe standard ofcare
could weaken as the public begins to view medicine as more of a business
than a profession. If commercialization deprives physicians of their protec-
tive standard of care, it also might free them to modify or escape their duty of
care via contract.2 "
6. Courts will admit evidence regarding the costs and benefits associ-
atedwith medical treatment decisions. Because prevailing practices no longer
will be an irrefutable proxy for reasonable care, courts will expect plaintiffs
and defendants to explain the reasons why the defendant's action was or was
not reasonable, just as the parties do in all other complex tort litigation.
7. Courts will need to reconcile their old armory of malpractice doc-
trines with a reasonable-physician standard of care. It will be necessary to
harmonize doctrines such as the respectable minority rule and the honest error
in judgment rule with the reasonable-physician standard of care. 4 Alterna-
tively, the doctrines simply may fall into obsolescence.
conscientious physicians and managed care plans. Furthermore, unlike contractual standards,
the proposed standard does not pose the risk that the poorest patients will receive no protection.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggest-
ing that reasonableness requires balancing of risk and utility); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 291 (1975) (same). The malpractice cases have not yet defined their terms.
243. See Henry M. Greenberg, American Medicine Is on the Right Track, 279 JAMA 426,
427 (1998) (noting that marketplace is attempting to control healthcare costs). Perhaps, legis-
latures consider cost-control projects too painful to undertake.
244. See Schwartz, supra note 186, at 889 (explaining prohibition on waiver of liability
as product of professional ideal).
245. See, e.g., Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977) (rejecting respectable
minority rule); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 276 (Wis. 1996) (allowing jury to
decide if both choices are acceptable).
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8. This shift in standards conceivably could produce more defensive
medicine and thereby interfere with efforts to control health care spending.
Physicians are likely to view a reasonable care test as more vague than a
custom-based test. The uncertainty that this standard of care introduces could,




Ten years ago, the American Law Institute and prominent legal scholars
were examining the case for treating medical malpractice as a unique field
governed by a unique no-fault liability regime. In the meantime, courts have
been moving away from a separate field of malpractice law and toward the
integration of medical malpractice cases within the broader fabric of general
negligence law.
There is no longer a judicial consensus favoring deference to customary
standards. Bythe beginning of 1999, a dozen states had expressly refused to
be bound by medical customs. Nine additional states, while not explicitly
rejecting deference to custom, had chosen to phrase the duty owed by physi-
cians in terms of reasonability, rather than compliance with medical customs.
In addition, several others states, like Pennsylvania, Ohio, Arizona, Michigan,
and California, have some authority favoring a reasonable-physician standard
and could easily join the others. Because of the subjectivity involved in
interpreting the law in all of these states, the numbers reported here should be
treated as preliminary estimates only. Nevertheless, they illuminate a quiet
and persistent shift in doctrine that has gone largely unnoticed.
Even more important than the number of states that have retreated from
custom-based norms is the evidence that this movement toward a reasonable-
physician standard has not abated. The process began inthe 1970s and has
continued through the 1990s. The steady pattern of defections from the
custom-based standard of care over the past several decades suggests that
more states will follow.
At present, fewer than half of the states clearly endorse a custom-based
standard of care. Even in these states, the custom-based standard of care often
is not enforced unless the plaintiff directly challenges an undisputed custom.
When no undisputed custom exists, the jury decides whether the defendant
behaved reasonably. As a result, custom plays a much less important role in
these states than doctrine would suggest.
246. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty about
standards of care leads to inefficiency); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts
Process: An EconomicAnalysis ofLegalForm, 76 CoRNELLL. REv. 341 (1991) (same).
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We will probably never know exactly why this quiet abandonment of
custom-based standards began. However, we do know that tort law is only
one of many legal fields in which courts have recently stripped professional
privileges away from physicians. Part of the explanation for this may lie in
declining public faith that medicine is special. As medicine becomes, and is
perceived as, more business-like, Americans and their judges may be less
willing to defer to the norms of health care providers.
Another part of the explanation for the shift toward a reasonable-physi-
cian standard probably lies in the movement of late twentieth century tort law
toward a generalized duty of reasonable care. As physicians lose their secular
priesthood, they become more vulnerable to this larger legal current.
This ongoing change in the legal standard of care has important and
complex policy considerations. The Author intends to address the policy
implications of the changing legal standard of care in a future article.
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